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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is devoted to examine the impact of economic interdependence on the
interstate relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China. Specifically, all three propositions emerging from the ongoing controversy over
the economics-security nexus inclusive of “economic interdependence increases
conflict”, “economic interdependence decreases conflict” and “economic
interdependence is irrelevant to conflict” shall be tested in an empirical analysis of Sino-
American relationship.
Three significant findings have emerged. Firstly, strong economic ties have
actually caused tensions between Washington and Beijing. However, these issues of great
disputes are not strong enough to turn into a Sino-American war because both countries
have gained tremendous benefits from their strong economic ties and are not willing to
destroy the economic ties that lock them together. Secondly, it is undeniable that
economic interdependence has greatly promoted peace and stability between Washington
and Beijing. However, there are three grounds for skepticism. To begin with, leaders
always put security concerns over the prospects for economic loss, especially in times of
insecurity and vulnerability. Furthermore, it is not yet certain that the linkages between
the two sides in different areas can guarantee peace between the two countries. Also,
there is a little historical evidence to believe that economic interdependence alone can
bring lasting stability in the international order. Thirdly, the third proposition ‘economic
interdependence is irrelevant to conflict” perfectly fits the Sino-American relationship.
To start with, Washington and Beijing have used trade to maximize their national power
not to suppress conflict. In addition, we should not limit the future of Sino-American
3relationship to the discussion of economic factors. Both sides have kept their relationship
relatively stable not only because of strong economic ties but also other factors such as:
the emergence of non-traditional threats and the mutual possession of nuclear weapons.
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6CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
---------------------------
I. OVERVIEW
An awareness that economic interdependence is essential to the survival and
prosperity of states began to surface with the realization that countries had been tied
closely together in a complex systemic web of interaction in which changes in one part
could have direct or indirect consequences in other parts of the system1. The topic of
economic interdependence, especially its virtues and vices has triggered considerable
controversy among scholars of international relations.
Though varied, the core assumption of liberalists, mostly classical liberalists and
liberal institutionalists is that economic interdependence provides a deterrent to armed
conflict. Specifically, economic interaction creates new avenues for communication and
avoids misunderstanding which may lead to conflict. Also, it creates a path toward
stability and well-being2. On the other hand, skeptics, especially Marxist-Leninist and
neo-realists, insist that economic interdependence either increases or is irrelevant to
armed conflict3. In other words, economic linkages do not bring about pacifying effects
on conflict but act as “a contributing factor in the impoverishment of some nations and
tensions between other nations” or are “largely irrelevant to leaders’ decisions to engage
in, or refrain from, intense forms of interstate conflict”4.
1 Andrew, Little, Mann, Nicholson, Rosenau, Sylvester, Wallerstein, and Waever. ‘International Theory:
Positivism and Beyond’ in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (ed.). Legacies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), pp. 47-128, p. 77
2 Barbieri, Katherine ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?’,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 29-49, p.30-31
3 Barbieri ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?’,  p.32-33
4 Barbieri, ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?’, p. 29.
7What is the impact of economic interdependence on the interstate relations
between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China? For decades,
states have clung to the hope that strong economic ties would facilitate the bonds of
friendship, open up opportunities to socialize China and make it more ready to follow the
status quo5 therefore, make war between these two highly interdependent Pacific nations
unlikely to occur. Specifically, optimists argue that economic ties would bind
Washington and Beijing in its web, hence, lead the two nations toward a cooperative and
peaceful relationship6.
Nevertheless, as skeptics have pointed out, there is a little historical evidence to
substantiate such a positive prospect. For example, Britain and Germany were major
trading partners before the First World War. Their strong economic ties, however, failed
to prevent the two countries from entering in one of the most disastrous wars in human
history. In addition, as skeptics have insisted, trade cannot create a path toward stability
and prosperity but serves as a source of insecurity. In fact, what brought Washington and
Beijing together in the early 1970s was not economic interdependence but rather the
military-strategic considerations. Furthermore, strong economic ties have indeed
triggered a number of trade disputes between the two sides. Therefore, for skeptics, a
high level of economic interdependence cannot ensure a future of stability and
cooperation between these two great powers.
These two arguments have driven us to several questions: Given the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991 and the challenges of China economic rise to American
superiority, what are the factors that bind the two Pacific nations closely together? More
5 Kugler, Jacek and Tamen, Ronald. ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to  Power”, p.50
6 Chen-Yuan Tung, ‘The Impact of Bilateral Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations’.
http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~ctung/Documents/W-B-a-7.doc (5 July 2013).
8importantly, is economic interdependence alone sufficient enough to create relative
stability between these two most powerful nations? The purpose of this research is to
address once again the impact of economic interdependence on Sino-American
relationship because the topic of economics-security nexus is not only theoretically
interesting but has important policy implications.
The economic rise of China has been one of the most important international
relations story in the 21st century. After roughly 150 years of being a weak player in the
world, China is now emerging as the economic powerhouse of the world7. The seeds of
China’s economic miracle were first planted in 1978 when the government of China
adopted a major program of economic reform after years of state control of all productive
assets8. As a result, China’s rapid Gross Domestic Products (GDP)9growth over the past
three decades has been very impressive, averaging 9.8% annually from 1978 to 200910.
While pre-1978 China had seen an annual growth of 6% a year (with some painful ups
and downs along the way), “post-1978 China saw an average real growth of more than 9
percent a year with fewer and less painful ups and down”11. Remarkably, the country
enjoyed an increase of over 13% in several peak years12. More importantly, China’s
economic rise is impressive not only because of its speed of expansion but its growing
7 Shirk, Susan., L. China: Fragile Superpower. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.4
8 Hu, Zuliu and Khan, Mohsin, S. ‘Why is China Growing So Fast? International Monetary Fund,
Washington, D. C, 1997.
http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES8/INDEX.HTM (5 July 2013)
9 The total market value of all the goods and services produced within the borders of a nation during a
specified period.,
10 Song, Liang. ‘China’s Rapid Growth and Development: An Historical and International Context’ (2010).
paftad.org/.../02_SONG,%20Ligang%20-%20Interl%20dim%20of%20g (5 July 2013), p.7
11 Hu and Khan. ‘Why is China Growing So Fast?
12 Hu and Khan. ‘Why is China Growing So Fast?
9mass and enormous potential13. “Given the sheer size of its population and the rising
productivity of its workers, China may one day regain its historic position as the world’s
largest economy”14. Actually, in 2010, China has become the world’s second largest
economy and most analysts predict that China will surpass the US as the world’s biggest
economy by 2050 and some as early as 2015 although it will not match the US in GDP
per capita terms15.
The most reasonable explanation for the significance of China economic rise is,
presumably, due to the assumption that its rise entails the decline of America16. Since the
Cold War, the US has carried out its global commitment, which requires enormous
resources, to secure peace and stability not only in its neighborhood but also other parts
of the world, especially in Europe, Asia and Persian Gulf17. More remarkably, the US,
during eight years under the Bush administration, pursued even more ambitious
objectives of “waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking to denuclearize North Korea
and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia” all at the
same time18. As a result, “the ultimate foundation of America power-the relative
superiority of the US economy in the world” has been in decline because of “the self-
inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative
current-account balancer and other internal economic weaknesses”19. For example, the
average annual rate of US growth was at 3.7% during Clinton’s years and fell remarkably
13 Friedberg, Aaron, L. ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’ International Security,
Vol.30, No.2 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 7-45, p. 17
14 Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’ p.17.
15 Beckley, Michael. ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure’, International Security, Vol.
36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41-78, p.58.
16 Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’. The National Interest, January-February 2009, pp.21-34,
p.21.
17 Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’, p.21.
18 Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’, p.21.
19 Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’, p.21
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to 2.2% during eight years under Bush administration. This trajectory has observed even
more negative signs due to the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis 20.
A rising China, for realist pessimists, can be a troublemaker. In fact, we have seen
that a wealthier China has strengthened its military capability. “China’s military budget
doubled from 1989 to 1994, and doubled again from 1994 to 1999, and again from 2005
to 2009”21. China’s expanding economy and growing military capabilities have driven the
majority of realist pessimists to a conclusion that “it (China) is unlikely to behave
differently than have others (rising powers) of its type throughout history”22. Specifically,
emerging powers are usually not satisfied with their roles and status in the current
system; therefore, tend to take steps to “secure their frontiers” and then “to reach out
beyond them” by challenging “territorial boundaries, international institutional
arrangement, and hierarchies of prestige”23. Meanwhile, dominant powers, feeling
threatened by their challengers, are likely to employ force to prevent emerging powers
before they achieve their full potential24. As a matter of fact, we have seen the increasing
concerns aroused over China’s upwardly mobility, for example, the assignment of
strategic competitor role for China in several policy circles in Washington25. Moreover,
although even American President Barack Obama wants “China’s economy to continue
to grow, its domestic demand to expand and its vitality to contribute to regional and
20 Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’, p.24.
21 Beckley. ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure’, p.73
22 Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’, p.20.
23 Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’, p.19.
24 Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, p.20.
25 Chan, Steve. ‘Is there a Power Transition between the US and China? The Different Faces of National
Power’. University of California Press. Vol. 45, No.5, September/October 2005, pp.687-701.
11
global prosperity”26, a preventive war or even more insidious risk of over-stretch remain
possible options for the US27.
However, a rising China is also important for American prosperity. Since the re-
establishment of political and economic relations in the early 1970s, the two countries
have gradually become trapped in a web of increasingly economic interdependence in
which changes in one country can result in direct or indirect consequences in the other.
For 22 years between 1949 and 1971, there was almost no trade between these two
Pacific nations. The first efforts to re-establish the direct contacts between Washington
and Beijing were undertaken in 1971. The renewal, however, was merely based on geo-
political considerations and driven by the complex relationship between US-Soviet Union
and Soviet Union-China rivalries. As a result, during the first ten years of 1971-1980,
business transactions between the two countries, though showed signs of improvement,
remained extremely modest28. An outstanding illustration could be President Nixon’s
1972 trip to China which was later described as the week changing the world, but which
“produced virtually no effect on the stock market”29.
It was not until the late 1970s with China’s turning to market-oriented reforms
that the country “has grown into one of the largest and most dynamic economies in the
world” and “become the manufacturing workshop of the world”30, trade flows between
Washington and Beijing advanced at breakneck pace31. However, a couple of decades
after Deng’s reform, the relationship was somewhat asymmetric in which China had
26 Obama, Barack . ‘US-China Policy Under an Obama Administration’. Amcham-China’s China Brief,
2008, p.1
27 Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’, pp.31-32.
Wang, Dong. ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’. Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, Vol. 39. No.3, 2010, pp. 165-210.
29 Wang. ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, (p.166)
30 Shirk. China: Fragile Superpower, pp. 15-16
31 Wang. ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.178.
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more to lose. It was not until after China was granted membership of the World Trade
Organization that the country has become America's fastest growing export market with
an average growth of 15% per annum32. Currently, China has been described as vital to
American economic health because of its low-cost manufactured goods and the fact that
it is now the biggest holder of US government debt33. In addition, there is no doubt that
“American prosperity and global influence increasingly depend on decisions made in
Beijing”34. Meanwhile, American investment is crucial to China because the country is
China’s important source of direct foreign investment, one of its largest investors and
export markets. China needs a strong US economy because the slowdown in the US has
severely affected China development35. Generally, the level of economic interdependence
reaches to such a high level that their economies are interpreted as something
symbiotic36.
High levels of economic interdependence, according to liberalist scholars, have
built up a great mutual interest in peace between Washington and Beijing. Specifically,
economic linkages have already helped to remove several major disruptions, and are
likely to tie the two countries closely, constrain and dampen any tendencies toward
conflict37. In fact, it is undeniable that economic interdependence plays an extremely
important part in maintaining a relative peace between these two Pacific nations.
32 (2012). ‘US Congressional District Exports to China: 2002-11 112th Congress’. The US-China Business
Council.
https://www.uschina.org/public/exports/2000_2011/files/US_Cong_Dist_Exports_2000-11.pdf (August 25,
2012)
33 Ryan, Sean. ‘Why is China so important to the U.S. economy?’ Hubpages.
http://kapitall.hubpages.com/hub/Why-is-China-so-Important-to-the-US-Economy (25 August 2012)
34 Shirk. China: Fragile Superpower, p.249
35 Chen, ‘The Impact of Bilateral Economic Interdependence on US-China Relations’
36 Young, Terry. ‘US and China Economic Relationship at a Crossroad’. China US Focus, 2012.
http://www.chinausfocus.com/slider/us-and-china-economic-relationship-at-a-crossroad/ (18 July 2013)
37 Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’, p.12.
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On the whole, the burgeoning Sino-American economic relationship has had a positive effect on
relations between the two countries. In the post-Cold War period, it has replaced the strategic
cooperation between the United States and China against the Soviet Union that had provided the
key foundation of US-China cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. The two world economies have
become increasingly interdependent38.
On the other hand, economic interdependence while helping to bind the two
countries closely together, becomes a source of insecurity. “Most recent U.S. initiatives
and complaints reflect a wide range of US interests and constituencies concerned with
perceived unfair or disadvantageous aspects of the massive US-China economic
relationship”39. Among these concerns, US trade deficit, Chinese currency valuation and
China’s holdings of US treasury securities have emerged as hints of serious economic
dispute or confrontation.
The purpose of this research is to address a big question: Can economic
interdependence deter Washington and Beijing from entering into an armed conflict? To
be more specific, this research will test the impact of economic interdependence on Sino-
American relationship. The three propositions about the economic interdependence-
conflict relationship are examined. They are that: “interdependence increases conflict”;
“interdependence decreases conflict”; and “interdependence is irrelevant to conflict”.
To be more specific, three sub-questions are discussed in this research. Firstly,
can economic ties create a path of stability and prosperity for Washington and Beijing?
Secondly, is economic interdependence a source of insecurity which can spark a war
between these two Pacific nations? Thirdly, is trade largely irrelevant to leaders’
decisions to engage in, or refrain from, intense forms of interstate conflict?
38 Sutter, Robert, G. US-Chinese Relation: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield Publisher, Inc, 2010), p.191
39 Sutter. US-Chinese Relation: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, p.192
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II. RESEARCH GOAL
The principal purpose of this thesis is to examine the relevance of the three
propositions about the economics-security nexus to the Sino-American relationship. A
wide range of published works, therefore, shall be reviewed, analyzed and discussed to
find out which proposition is the most relevant to Sino-American empirical study. The
relationship between Washington and Beijing is special not only because they are the two
largest economies in the world but also because they belong to the nuclear club. Given
the complicated characteristics of this relationship, efforts to mention all aspects of
economic and security dimensions would be too ambitious. This research, hence, will not
discuss the challenges of China’s rise to American dominance40. Also, it will not present
security issues between the two sides41. It will focus and only focus on Sino-American
economic interdependence and how it affects the security between these two powers. To
be more specific, it will discuss in detail concept of economic interdependence, describe
Sino-American remarkably strong economic interaction, examine the relevance of three
propositions about the trade-conflict to Sino-American relationship, and explore several
implications for both countries.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of economic interdependence has triggered a considerable
controversy among economists and scholars of international relations. The lack of
conceptual clarity and even denial of any generally accepted definition42 have attracted a
40 For additional information, see Beckley. ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure’ and
Pape, ‘Empire Falls: First Draft of History’.
41 For additional information, see Lawrence, Susan, V. ‘US-China Relations: Policy Issues’. Congressional
Research Service 7-5700 R41108 (2013).
42 Baldwin, David, A. ‘Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis’. International Organization,
Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, pp.471-506
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number of researchers to conduct analyses on this concept, for example, Baldwin,
Keohane and Nye, Barbieri, Mansfield and Pollins, and Crescenzi43. Despite the
availability of conceptual analyses, the meaning of economic interdependence remains
ambiguous or elusive, hence, there is a need to find out which one best describes the
economic ties between Washington and Beijing.
In addition, a large number of studies such as those of Barbieri, Mansfield and
Pollins and Ravenhill44 have mentioned the three propositions about the economic
interdependence-conflict relationship. These studies provided detailed arguments put
forward by the different schools of thought to prove their propositions. Given their strong
focus on theories, these studies provided a comprehensive understanding of how different
schools of international relations have explained the complicated relationship of
economic interdependence and conflict. However, they failed to provide throughout
researches of how these theories are applicable in reality.
Furthermore, not surprisingly, such a special relationship of Washington and
Beijing has attracted quite a great number of scholars of international relations. In fact,
the two dimensions of economics and security have received the most attention.
Specifically, many scholars put great efforts in describing the economic relationship
between the two Pacific nations as well as the tensions emerging from their strong trade
43 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis’; Keohane, Robert, O. and Nye, Joseph S.
Jr. ‘Power and Interdependence’. Interdependence as an Analytic Concept. (Longman Classics and Political
Science, 2001); Barbieri, Katherine. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (University of
Michigan Press, 2002); Mansfield, Edward, D. and Pollins, Brian, M. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An
Introduction’; Crescenzi, Mark J. C. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics. (University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2002)
44 Barbieri, ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?’; Mansfield,
Edward, D. and Pollins, Brian, M. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’; Ravenhill, J. ‘Security
Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A regional-global’. The economics-security nexus in the Asia-Pacific Region.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
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linkages, for instance, Dumbaugh, Sengupta, Wang, Liew, and Morrison45. Additionally,
several scholars tried to use the theories of economic interdependence to predict the
future characteristics of Sino-American relationship, to name a few, Tellis and Will, Nye,
and Friedberg46. However, there has not been yet any attempt to measure the level of
economic interdependence between the two countries. Also, economic interdependence
only makes up a small part in works studying the future of the Sino-American
relationship. Moreover, there has been not yet any thorough scientific research focusing
on testing all three propositions and their related arguments. This research, therefore, is
the very first attempt to link the theoretical framework of economics-security to explain
whether or not remarkably strong economic ties can lead to a stable relationship between
Washington and Beijing.
IV. RESEARCH STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 presents a detailed overview of the analytical framework of this thesis:
the concepts of economic interdependence and conflict and the relationship between
these two. Specifically, this chapter attempts to identify the best-fit definition of
economic interdependence to Sino-American relationship.  In addition, this chapter
presents how different schools of thoughts in international relations put forward their
arguments to explain the relationship between two dimensions of economics and security.
45 Dumbaugh, Kerry. ‘China-US Relations: Current Issues and Implications for US Policy’. Congressional
Research Service, 2009, 7-5700, R40457; Sengupta, Jayshree. ‘Economic Relations between the US and
Two Asian Giants’ in a Rasgotra, M. (ed).  (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2007); Wang. ‘China’s Trade
Relations with the United States in Perspective’; 45 Liew, Leong. H. ‘US Trade Deficits and Sino-US
Relations’, Department of International Business & Asian Studies, Griffith University, Queensland,
Australia, 2010; and Morrison, Wayne M. ‘China-US Trade Issues’. Congressional Research Service,
2013, 7-5700, RL 33536.
46 Tellis, Ashley. J and Wills, Michael (ed.). ‘Trade, Interdependence, and Security in Asia’. Strategic Asia
2006-07. (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research); Nye, Joseph, S., Jr. ‘American and
Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis’. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010, pp.143-153;
Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, and Friedberg, Aaron, L. ‘A Contest
for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia’. Roots of Rivalry (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2011), pp. 36-58
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Chapter 3 is devoted to measure the level of economic interdependence between
Washington and Beijing. Once again, this research shall use the theme of openness to
measure Sino-American economic interdependence, focusing on two main indicators:
trade and investment. Also, three trade disputes inclusive of American massive deficit
with China, China’s currency policy and China’s holding of US securities shall be
discussed in detail.
Chapter 4 examines the three propositions on economics-security nexus to the
Sino-American relationship. Specifically, all related arguments emerging from the three
propositions are to be tested to answer the research question: Can strong economic
interdependence deter the two countries from entering into an armed conflict against each
other?
Chapter 5 concludes what has been discussed in the research and investigates
several implications for both countries given their high level of economic
interdependence.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE-SECURITY NEXUS
------------------------------------
I. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
The concept of interdependence has triggered a considerable controversy among
economists and scholars of international relations. The lack of conceptual clarity and
even denial of generally accepted definition47 have attracted a number of researchers to
study on this topic.
Generally, most of scholars on all sides have ignored interdependence/mutual
dependence distinction and they have used the two concepts almost interchangeably48.
Keohane and Nye, for example, define dependence as “a state of being determined or
significantly affected by external forces” while “interdependence, most simply defined
means mutual dependence”49. In addition, Baldwin highlights that the differences
between the two basic meanings of dependence are similar to those often made between
sensibility interdependence and vulnerability interdependence50.
However, Katherine Barbieri objects to such usage of the two terms. For Barbieri,
interdependence and mutual dependence mean differently to different people, therefore,
should not be used to refer to the same phenomenon. She assumes only when there is
presence of mutual needs, interdependence can emerge from dependence51. Nevertheless,
given the importance of economic linkages to the survival and well-being of states in
today’s world, there is always presence of mutual needs. Therefore, there should not
stress the distinction between interdependence and mutual dependence because if there
47 Baldwin, David, A. ‘Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis’. International Organization,
Vol. 34, No. 4, 1980, pp.471-506, pp.471-2
48 Barbieri, Katherine. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (University of Michigan Press,
2002), p.12
49 Keohane, Robert, O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr. ‘Power and Interdependence’. Interdependence as an
Analytic Concept. (Longman Classics and Political Science, 2001), p.7
50 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: a Conceptual Analysis’, p.475
51 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 13
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are differences, interdependence is more easily extended to a case where more than two
economies are involved52.
Understanding such a complicated concept of interdependence needs more than a
single definition, therefore, different aspects of this concept should be analyzed. As this
writing is devoted to study the relationship between Washington and Beijing with a focus
on their economic relations, the next section will discuss different dimensions of the
concept with a strong interest in economic interdependence.
1. Sensitivity/Vulnerability
Baldwin presents two basic meanings of dependence. Firstly, dependence is used
to refer to situations of being conditioned or seriously affected by external forces.
Secondly, dependence refers to the relationship of subordination. In this second meaning,
one needs the support or relies upon others in order to fulfill a need. Furthermore, as
discussed, Baldwin also notes that while the first meaning of dependence corresponds to
sensitivity interdependence, the later corresponds to vulnerability interdependence53.
These two basic meanings have been developed to propose a definition of
economic interdependence as follows:
In the field of international relations, economic interdependence has two meanings. First, a group
of country is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent on those
found in the others….Second, countries are considered interdependent if it would be costly for
them to rupture or forego their relationship54.
Moreover, after conducting a survey on how dependence has been conceptualized
in two periods between 1568 and 1968 and from 1968 onwards, Baldwin comes to a
conclusion that it is the second meaning or vulnerability interdependence which has been
used in the common sense. In other words, vulnerability interdependence, defined as the
opportunity costs55 of interrupting a relationship, represents normal usage by both
economists and scholars of international relations56.
52 Personal interview with Hawke, Gary, New Zealand Institute for Economic Research., 13 June 2013
53 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, pp.476-489
54 Mansfield, Edward, D. and Pollins, Brian, M. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.11
www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098276-intro.pdf (2 July 2013)
55 The loss of potential gain from other alternatives when one alternative is chosen.
56 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.475.
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Hirschman does not define interdependence explicitly but figures out how a trade
relationship would be translated into power and influence57. The two concepts of “gain
from trade” and “dependence on trade”, for Hirschman, should be viewed as the two
aspects of the same phenomenon. The total gain from trade country B achieving from its
trading relationship with country A reflects the total impoverishment or cost bear on
country B in the event of trade termination between the two58. Hirschman even goes
further by identifying two conditions in which country A may exercise its influence on its
trading partner. Firstly, the cost of losing its total gain from trade needs to be high enough
to ensure the compliance of country B to country A. Secondly, country A is able to find a
substitute to replace country B in the event of trade termination59. Clearly, in his work,
Hirschman does not refer to the first meaning but uses the second meaning to clarify the
term of dependence as the opportunity costs of terminating a trading relationship60.
Baldwin’s finding can be also exemplified by looking at Keohane and Nye’s
definition of interdependence. Specifically, Keohane and Nye discuss interdependence in
two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability. The first dimension refers to situations in
which a state is largely sensitive to changes in other countries while the second refers to
its ability to compensate and rebound from those changes61. In other words, sensitivity
interdependence answers two questions. Firstly, how long does it take for changes in one
country to produce costly effects to its trading partners? Secondly, how significant are
those costly effects? Meanwhile, the second dimension of vulnerability interdependence
“rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors
face”62.
For example, country A and country B is immediately and seriously affected by
increased oil price occurred in their oil exporter, country C. It then comes to a conclusion
that both of them are sensitive to changes in country C. However, if A is able to find out
the alternative market to replace C while B is unable to do the same thing, B is more
vulnerable to A when referring to their trading relationship with C.
57 Crescenzi, Mark J. C. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics. (University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2002), p.45.
58 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.478
59 Crescenzi. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, p.45-6
60 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.478
61 Crescenzi. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, p.49
62 Keohane and Nye. ‘Power and Interdependence’, p.11
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Baldwin agrees that the two dimensions of interdependence need to be
distinguished. However, he suggests using a less misleading term for sensitivity
interdependence. In fact, he puts forward three strong arguments against maintaining the
sensitivity/vulnerability distinction concerning the conventional usage of the term,
possibility of factual misleading and the availability of other terms which can make
desired distinction.63
To begin with, the first argument addresses the conventional usage of the term
interdependence. Specifically, there is no need to maintain the sensibility/vulnerability
distinction because scholars of international relations and even economists have used the
term in the second meaning of vulnerability interdependence. As Baldwin concludes:
The works surveyed here suggest that the concept….has corresponded with “vulnerability
interdependence”64.
From a conceptual standpoint the period since 1968 has contributed very little to thinking about
international interdependence. Although scholars seem to vie with one another to invent yet
another definition of “interdependence”, the need for new concepts has not been demonstrated65.
And
Vulnerability interdependence has a superior claim to the mantle of conventionality, at least in
international relations, and perhaps even in economics66.
Furthermore, the second argument against maintaining the distinction between
sensitivity and vulnerability is the concern over the possibility of confusion. As Baldwin
pointed out, sensitivity interdependence may be inversely related to its conventional
usage. It is bad not to adopt the conventional usage and it is even worse to introduce a
totally different new meaning for an old and frequently used concept.67
Finally, the most important argument highlights the availability of other terms. It
is much better to use terms such as mutual responsiveness, mutual sensitivity or mutual
influence to translate the idea of “the sensitivity of economic transactions between two or
more nations to economic developments within those nations”68.
63 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.490
64 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.486
65 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.489
66 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.491
67 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.491
68 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.491
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In short, scholars on all sides of the arguments have noticed and well understood
the differences between sensitivity and vulnerability for centuries. However, there is no
need to distinguish interdependence into two dimensions because the sensitivity has been
proved to be unclear and confusing. Sensitivity should be retained but it is necessary to
change its name to something less misleading. Therefore, interdependence should be
corresponded with its clear, time-honored and still useful dimension of vulnerability.69
2. Costs/benefits
Of a particular concern are costs and benefits in a trading relationship. States
participate in trading transactions because of returned benefits. In other words, benefits
must exist because they push states forward a trading relationship. The more states trade,
the more easily they can be trapped in the web of economic interdependence. The denser
the web is, the higher the costs of terminating such a trading relationship will be for
involved states. To be more specific, costs and benefits emerge at the same time. The
more a state gets from a trading relationship, the more it needs to pay in case of trade
interruption70. In addition, Keohane and Nye strongly emphasize the existence of costly
effects to give rise to interdependence from international transactions- the flows of
money, goods, people and messages. They also develop two perspectives for cost-
benefits analysis of an interdependent relationship with the first focusing on joint gains or
joint losses of involved parties and the other concerning relative gains and distributional
issues71.
3. Salience/Symmetry
Barbieri categorizes interdependence into two dimensions: salience and
symmetry. Salience refers to “the importance of a trading relationship, relative to other
trading relationships”72. In other words, the significance of trade between two states
needs not be identical to those conducted by one of them with other states. Accordingly,
the salience of the economic relationship varies within dyads. Meanwhile, measuring
symmetry allows us to find out whether or not partners are equally dependent on each
69 Baldwin. ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, p.492
70 Crescenzi. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, p.48
71 For additional information, see Keohane, Robert, O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr. ‘Power and Interdependence’.
Realism and Complex Interdependence. (Longman Classics and Political Science, 2001), pp. 20-32
72 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 57
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other in a trading relationship.73 In addition, symmetry refers to the relative balance of
economic interdependence. Meanwhile, asymmetry means the opposite. At one extreme,
perfect symmetry (very rare) occurs when two trading partners are equally dependent
upon each other. On the other hand, since perfect asymmetry (which does not occur in
real life) exists in a trading dyad, one state is completely dependent on its partner while
its partner has almost no dependence on the first state74.
More importantly, in international relations, states can get power if they are the
less dependent actors. If two countries engage in a trading relationship and one is less
dependent on another, the less dependent state has a source of power if both countries
want to maintain their relationship75. “Manipulating the asymmetries of interdependence
is an important dimension of economic power. Perfect symmetry is quite rare; so most
cases of economic interdependence also involve a potential power relationship”76.
Therefore, interdependence should not be limited to evenly balance mutual dependence
because less dependent actors (the more powerful states) are very likely to use the power
from asymmetric interdependence as a source of influence in dealing with another.77
II. MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
Although there are many ways to measure the level of economic interdependence,
these measures usually emphasize one of the three themes: openness, vulnerability, or
gain. While the indicators of openness and absolute gains have been employed by
advocators of liberal theory, vulnerability and relative gains have been in favour by
supporters of realist and neo-mercantilist arguments78.
1. Openness
“Openness indicators are based in one way or another on the ratio of trade to total
economic output”79. This theme is based on the assumption that the more a state trades,
the more it relies on an interdependent relationship because of the costly effects in the
73 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 57
74 Crescenzi. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, p.52
75 Nye, Joseph, S., Jr. ‘American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis’. The Washington Quaterly,
Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010, pp.143-153, p.147.
76 Nye. ‘American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis’, p.147.
77 Keohane and Nye. ‘Power and Interdependence’, p. 9
78 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p. 11 and 16
79 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
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event of trade termination. Of the three themes, openness has been most widely employed
to measure the level of economic interdependence.80
2. Vulnerability
Those who are in favour of the vulnerability theme often employ indicators of
trade asymmetry to measure the level of economic interdependence. “Typically, such
indicators are constructed using the portion of trade (imports and/or exports) between a
given pair of states, A and B, represented in a total trade of A and the total trade of B”81.
Accordingly, the difference between two figures reflects the asymmetry in a trading
relationship.82
3. Gain
The gain theme is different because it does not rely on the trade flows but the
gains from trade to measure interdependence83. However, it is hard to measure gains from
trade; therefore, it can only be measured indirectly by presuming “what total product
would be if there was no cross-border trade”84. It is argued that the gains from trade can
be collected by observing the import (or export) price elasticity which challenges scholars
who are in favour of this theme because of the data’s limited availability.85
Concerning this theme, there should be mentioned of absolute and relative gains.
Absolute gain theory measures the total effects of an action. It is very much related to the
positive-sum game which assumes that trade is beneficial to all involved parties. On the
other hand, relative gains refer to the benefits a state gets compared to the other. The
theory of relative gains relates to the zero-sum game which insists that states need to
compete with others to gain more benefits86. Simply put, relative gains theory pays more
attention to how the gains are shared, not the total gain available.
The problem of these measures is that they are heavily dependent on trade data
which may not accurately reflect the level of interdependence. Although trade data is
assumed to be highly correlated with other forms of economic exchange, its validity
80 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
81 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
82 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
83 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
84 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
85 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.12.
86 Cai, Feina.  ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in the Real World’. E-International Relations, 2011
http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/absolute-and-relative-gains-in-the-real-world/ (16 July 2013)
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opens for question “especially in an era when merchandise trade composed a dwindling
fraction of all economic exchange”87. More importantly, in some cases, trade data can be
fragmented and incomplete88. Furthermore, we have not known yet whether or not all
aspects of economic interdependence such as commercial interdependence and monetary
interdependence will have the same impact on conflicts89.
III. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE-CONFLICT RELATIONSHIP
There has been an increasing attempt to study the controversial relationship
between conflict and economic interdependence. There are currently different clusters of
opinion in the debate on whether or not economic interdependence creates stability or
vulnerability in the international system. Despite variations in their arguments, the core
assumption of liberal theorists claims that interdependence acts as a deterrent to conflict.
On the other hand, the opponents of pessimistic-skeptical Marxism and realism are quite
divided who insist that interdependence either increases or is irrelevant to conflicts. The
following section will look at these three proportions of “Economic Interdependence
Decreases Conflict”, “Economic Interdependence Increases Conflict” and “Economic
Interdependence Is Relevant to Conflict”
1. Economic Interdependence Increases Conflict
Skeptics have proposed two arguments to support the assumption that
interdependence increases hostilities.
Firstly, the dependency and neo-Marxists schools of thought claims that “rather
than increasing the prosperity of trading partners, trade often results in the
impoverishment of less powerful nations”90. The core assumption of this dependency
theory bases on trade imbalance between the developed (the core) and the developing
(the periphery) countries in which “gains from trade are enjoyed exclusively by
developed states….and trade relegates powerless states to a position of dependence”91. In
a trade asymmetry, the more dependent state is more likely to bear greater costs and
87 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.14.
88 Frensch, Richard, Hanousek, Jan, Kocenda, Evzen. ‘Incomplete specialization and trade in parts and
components’, p.2.
89 Mansfield and Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.14.
90 Barbieri, Katherine. ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?
Journal of Peace Research, Vol.33, No.1 (Feb., 1996), pp.29-49, p.32.
91 Barbieri. ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?, p.32.
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fewer benefits92. Accordingly, the power from asymmetric interdependence may be used
by the less dependent state to coerce or manipulate their trade partners. Since extensive
economic dependence poses challenges to the national autonomy and state sovereignty, it
can trigger efforts to break the dependent ties93.
Secondly, the first argument connects us to the realism’s skeptical attitude toward
cooperation, the theory of relative gains. States, as claimed by realists, in anarchy fear
that the benefits of joint gains that advantage a trading partner might produce a more
dangerous potential enemy. Therefore, relative gains can inhibit cooperation94. More
importantly, while relative gains may not matter when states trade with its allies or a
relatively weak state, they do trigger considerable concerns when states trade with a
relatively equal power or those who has the potential to become one95. In addition, in
order to consolidate such a notion, neo-realists confirm that even in the presence of
absolute gains, the benefits a state gets compared to others can dominate a rational
leader’ foreign policy behaviors. “Even when states are thought to benefit absolutely
from trade, one state might consider its partner’s disproportionate gain to be a loss to
itself in terms of relative power. This is particularly the case when trading relations
possess characteristics of cooperation as well as competition”96. Simply put, concerns
over unequal gains from trade can turn into real challenge to national security97.
2. Economic Interdependence Decreases Conflict
Liberalist theorists hold a very positive view of economic interdependence. Upon
the increasing trend of globalization in which no country can ever survive without
opening up their economies, security interests have been replaced by economic interests
that in turn, now is defined as a mean for wealth and prosperity.98 Economic
interdependence, as claimed by liberalist scholars, lowers the possibility of war by
increasing the value of trade over the alternative of aggression and making war too
92 Barbieri. ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?, p.32.
93 Barbieri. ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?, p.32.
94 Grieco, Joseph. M. ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism’. International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 485-507, p.487.
95 Islam, Akm, Khairul. ‘The Post-Cold War US-China Relations: Win-Win or Zero-Sum Game, Asian
Affairs, Vol.28, No. 2, April-June 2006, pp.24-45, p.28.
96 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p.33
97 Islam. ‘The Post-Cold War US-China Relations: Win-Win or Zero-Sum Game’, p.28.
98 Crescenzi. Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics, p.17
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costly. States, which assumed to be rational, therefore, should seek to avoid war and
enhance trade with others to avoid the high opportunity cost of involving in wars.
Although liberalist scholars share a common positive perspective toward the
linkage of trade to peace and prosperity, different strands of liberalism base on different
dynamics to explain the complex nexus of interdependence and conflict. In fact, they
have proposed five different arguments concerning the pacifying effects of trade on
hostilities.
Firstly, optimists have assumed that states participate in trading activities
voluntarily because trade benefits them all. States, for liberalist scholars, obtain benefits
through exchanges and greater specification, therefore, become richer. To be more
specific, trading activities provide states opportunity to exchange products by selling and
buying things with lower prices, thus, gain revenue and boost consumption99.
Furthermore, trade also helps states to specialize in goods and services which they hold
comparative advantages100, therefore, increase states’ economic efficiency. Overall, the
most apparent outcome of economic is increased wealth for all. Due to the gains from
trade, states shall avoid any possibility of conflict.
Secondly, another argument attributing the inverse relationship between trade and
conflict studies this complicated relationship at domestic level. Of a particular interest, at
sub-systemic level, is the pressure on governments by different actors who benefit from
the increase in wealth from trade. These actors want their governments to peacefully
resolve disputes with countries which they do business with. In other words, states are
deterred from initiating conflict against a trading partner because “commercial openness
generates efficiency gains that, in turn, render private traders and consumers dependent
on foreign markets”101. On the one hand, beneficial actors seek to protect their gains from
trade by encouraging governments to cooperate with other nations. On the other hand,
public officials who seek to push up their country’s economic performance and need such
beneficial actors for political support have reason to accommodate their demands102.
99 Barbieri. ‘The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Conflict’, p.23
100 The ability to produce goods and/or services at a lower opportunity cost than other’s
101 Mansfield, Edward D. and Pollins, Brian M. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’.
www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098276-intro.pdf (16 July 2013), p.3
102 Mansfield & Pollins. ‘Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction’, p.3
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Thirdly, another argument supporting the pacifying effects of economic
interdependence on conflict bases on an assumption that trade now plays an increasingly
more efficient means for creating wealth and influence than the old method of military
conquest and external expansion. In the current context, it is not land and raw materials
which can guarantee a state’s wealth and influence and it is “almost always cheaper in
both financial and political terms to buy raw materials from other countries than to
endure the international odium of mounting an invasion in order to seize them”103.
Additionally, since the principal security concerns in the economic realm for most states
shift from access to raw materials to access to markets, finance and technology, any
temptation to use military force to secure the former will result in the potential loss of the
latter104.
Fourthly, optimists have also insisted that “intense conflict is deterred when
leaders consider the welfare losses associated with an interruption to trade”105. The
possibilities of intense form of conflict between major trading partners have lessened not
because of the act of trade itself but the fear of losing the associated benefits.
Specifically, the interruption of trade is assumed to lead to the loss of associated benefits
emerging from a trading relationship. In addition, even in the absence of such loss, “it
(conflict) will lead to inferior terms of trade, such as lower prices for exports and higher
prices for imports”106. Therefore, in the policy-making process, it is no doubt that leaders
will be very much affected by the calculation of benefits and costs from trade, especially
with the most important trading partners.
Finally, liberalist theories have claimed that the expansion of interstate trading
network is thought to improve communication across boundaries, “reduce
misunderstanding and foster cultural and institutional mechanism capable of mediating
conflicts of interest that do arise”107. Furthermore, as liberals, functionalists and neo-
functionalists claim, interdependence is assumed to link and intertwine economic and
political structures of states which results in the convergence of national interests and
103 ‘Human Security Report’ (2009/10). Why International Wars are increasingly Rare, p.29
104 Ravenhill, J. ‘Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A regional-global’. The economics-security nexus in
the Asia-Pacific Region. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
105 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 23
106 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 24
107 Barbieri. ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?’, p.31
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cultures. To be more specific, the stronger and closer commercial linkages among states
are, the more cooperative they will be in other areas. As a result, there shall emerge a
number of institutions, both formal and informal to foster trade and have spillover
effects108 in other fields109.
3. Economic Interdependence is Irrelevant to Conflict
A third type of argument is based on the realist skeptical view on the relevance of
economic interdependence to war or peace. The core assumption of this realist theory is
that the causes of war are political and military-strategic considerations rather than purely
economic ones. Simply put, trade may serve as a mean to pursue the national interests
which can easily be broken when states consider military conflicts options. While conflict
originates from security-seeking or power-maximizing behaviors, peace can be achieved
from the balance of power110. In other words, it is not economic but strategic concerns of
“the balance of military forces, nuclear deterrence, the distribution of power, even
advances in military technology” dominating leaders’ calculation of the utility of
conflicts111. It does not mean that trade is not at of great important to realists. In fact,
trade has been seen as the tool of influence. Moreover, strategic commodities provided
from trade ties are of great important to states. However, when it comes to the question of
conflict engagement, leaders may not pay special attention to the potential harm such a
conflict may cause to a trading relationship.112
Simply put, discussions over the three proportions on economics-security nexus
have provided us a much better understanding upon the impacts of economic
interdependence on interstate relationship. The question now is: how are relevant theories
to reality? The following chapters are meant to examine these theories to an empirical
study of the Sino-American economics-security nexus.
108 The notion that integration between states in one economic sector will create strong incentives for
integration in further sectors
109 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, pp.26-7
110 Tellis, Ashley. J and Wills, Michael (ed.). ‘Trade, Interdependence, and Security in Asia’. Strategic Asia
2006-07. (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research), p.3
111 VanHook, Lauren. ‘China in the Balance: Can Economic Interdependence Bring Stability to South Asia’
www.moreheadstate.edu/uploadedFiles/Sites/Main_Sites/.../china.pdf (17 July 2013), p. 13
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CHAPTER 3
SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
RECENT SINO-AMERICAN TRADE DISPUTES
--------------------------
As noted in Chapter 2, economic interdependence has been measured by different
ways with an emphasis on one of three themes: openness, vulnerability and gain. Among
these, openness has been most widely employed to measure the level of economic
interdependence because of data availability and the assumption that the more a state
trades, the more it relies on an interdependent relationship. This research, once again,
shall use the theme of openness to measure the Sino-American economic
interdependence, focusing on two main indicators: trade and investment. I found that
Washington and Beijing have been locked into the so-called “balance of financial terror”,
a situation characterized by the fact that the US is Chinese largest export market and
China is American largest creditor113. Moreover, a number of frictions have emerged
along with their increasing mutually economic interdependence such as American large
trade deficit with China, China’s currency devaluation, China’s holding of American
securities, China’s food safety, and WTO implementation issues, etc. The three first
related issues shall be discussed in detail in this chapter.
I. SINO-AMERICAN BILATERAL TRADE 1971-2012
Despite its questionable validity, trade shall be used to measure economic
interdependence between Washington and Beijing because it is the most traditional and
most frequently used indicator of economic interdependence. Washington and Beijing
traded for years before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
However, the Chinese communist revolution, the Korean War and American trade
sanctions against China caused a massive reduction of business transactions between the
two sides114. First steps to renew commercial activities between Washington and Beijing,
notably the visit made by US President Richard Nixon, were traced back at the early
1970s after years of freezing. Bilateral trade, however, did not improve significantly
113 Rajan, Ramkishen, S. and Beverinotti, Javier. ‘China, Currencies and the Financial Balance of Terror’.
Policy Brief Series, Issue 2, 2011, p. 1.
114 Islam, Akm, Khairul. ‘The Post-Cold War US-China Relations: Win-Win or Zero-Sum Game, Asian
Affairs, Vol.28, No. 2, April-June 2006, pp.24-45, p.27.
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during the first ten years after the rapprochement (1971-1980) because China still closed
its door to the world. Since 1978 with China’s turning to market-oriented reforms, the
two sides have been observing remarkably increasing economic interdependence. Total
US-China trade rose from roughly $ 2.3 billion in 1979 to $366 billion in 2009115. “China
is the US’s second largest trade partner and the US is China’s largest one…China is the
US’s largest source of trade deficit while the US is China’s largest source of trade
surplus”116. In the following section, I will discuss significant changes in Sino-American
trade relationship in three periods: 1971-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2012.
1. China-US Trade Relations: 1971-1980
Efforts to re-establish direct contacts between the US and China were undertaken
in 1971 with the removal of restrictions on US citizens visiting China, the ping-pong
diplomacy with American table tennis player touring around China, and measures to lift
restrictions on commerce and travel between the two countries. More remarkably, the
elimination of trade embargo in June 10th 1971 and the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 2758 which brought China onto the Security Council in place of the Republic
of China in Taiwan in October 1971 officially ended China’s quarter  century of isolation
chiefly promoted by the US117.
However, there was little prospect of significant improvement in the bilateral
trade between Washington and Beijing. China’s market was described as illusory given
the fact that this populated nation had a GNP118 only about 7% of that of the US119.
According to American figures120, their total bilateral trade stood at US$4.7
million in 1971. Although there saw several ups and downs, generally, the overall picture
reflected an upward trend in total trade flows between the two countries. By the year
1978, the total trade volume reached roughly US$1,100 million. This hundred-time-
115 Wang, Dong. ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’. Journal of Current
Chinese Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2010, pp.165-210.
116 Xinchun, Niu. ‘Sino-US Relations: Dependence and Fragility’. China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations, 2010.
http://www.chinausfocus.com/library/think-tank-resources/china-lib/foreign_policy/cicir-sino-us-relations-
dependence-and-fragility-february-2010/ (8 July 2013)
117 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, pp.169-170.
118 GNP or “Gross National Product is the value of all the goods and services produced in an economy, plus
the value of the goods and services imported, less the goods and services exported”
http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/gross_national.htm (10 July 2013).
119 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p. 170
120 See Table 1
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increase from a small base reflected a continued growth but still at a relatively low level
in the total volume of trade between the two sides. The situation, though, changed
significantly when the two countries finally normalized their diplomatic relations in
January 1st 1979. Along with the full establishment of diplomatic relations, the two sides
worked on removing the remaining legislative and administrative barriers to facilitate
business transactions121. As a result, a wide range of development was seen to encourage
full trade normalization during the next 12 months inclusive of “a bilateral trade
agreement; the opening of the first American law firm…in mainland China since 1950;
US assistance with Chinese hydro-electronic power development, consumer goods
manufacturing, and petroleum production and transportation; export-import bank credits;
approval for expanded arms sales to China; and a Chinese commitment to exporting
scarce strategic materials”122.
Simply put, as could be observed from tables 1 and 2, the first decade (1971-
1980) possessed these following characteristics:
Firstly, business transactions between the two countries displayed signs of
improvement but remained modest. Secondly, there was almost no correspondence
between the figures recorded by the two countries, except for the last two years of the
period (1979 and 1980). In addition, American trade with China never exceeded over 1%
of total US trade worldwide. Overall, the US had a trade surplus with China. Finally, the
total trade conducted between the two sides was doubling each year during the last three
consecutive years from 1978 to 1980 (according to American figures, total trade volume
was US $1,114.6 million, US $2,316.3 million and US$ 4,812 million in 1978, 1979 and
1980 respectively. According to Chinese figure, it was US $991.70 million in 1978, US
$2,451.60 million in 1979 and US $4,811.27 million in 1980). The figures could be seen
as positive signs of a prosperous trading relationship later on between Washington and
Beijing.
2. China-US Trade Relation: 1981-1990
The decade of 1981-1990 witnessed the initial phase of Chinese economic reform
led by Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. Reforms were carried out in agriculture, foreign
121 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p. 172
122 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p. 172
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policy, price system, non-state sectors, banking and financial sector, economic and social
infrastructure and social welfare system123. This so-called second revolution made China
a serious competitor and brought wealth into the country more than anytime since the
foundation of the Republic of China in 1949. Notably, Chinese government encouraged
foreign companies to invest into the country by giving general incentives such as tax
reduction, flexible labor laws in special economic zones, etc124. Additionally, an
important step to enhance Sino-American economic relations “was the steady liberalizing
of controls over American exports of advanced technology. In 1980, such exports to
China were reassigned from category Y (the Warsaw Treaty countries) to category P
(new US trading partners, and then, in May 1983…to category V (American allies)”125.
Moreover, in the 1970s, Chinese imports from the US were mainly iron and steel while
the 1980s saw a diversification of products importing from the US including grain,
chemicals and industrial raw materials, fertilizer, instruments and communications and
transportation equipment, wood products, and chemical fibers. More remarkably, for the
second half of the period, the US started to export finished manufactures and high-tech
products to this giant market. Generally, both Washington and Beijing enjoyed benefits
from their trading activities although trade with China was still very small for America126.
Overall, the period of 1981-1990 presented the following characteristics:
Firstly, as could be observed from tables 3 and 4, there was a great difference in
the figures recorded by the two countries over the extent of China’s exports. In 1990, for
example, according to American figures, the US import from China was US$ 15,233.9
million while the Chinese figure stood at only US$ 6,580 million. More importantly,
according to American figures, Washington has run a trade deficit with China since 1983
which has kept increasing over years. To be more specific, in 1983, Washington had a
trade deficit with China at only US$ 68 million. However, in 1990, only seven years
later, the figure saw a massive increase of roughly 150 times to US$ 10,416.6 million.
Nevertheless, China figures showed the otherwise. China had a trade deficit instead of
123 Chow, Gregory, C. ‘Economic Reform and Growth in China’. Annals of Economic and Finance, Vol.5,
2004, pp. 127-152.
124 Sengupta, Jayshree. ‘Economic Relations between the US and Two Asian Giants’ in a Rasgotra, M.
(ed).  (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2007), pp.103-120
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trade surplus with the US. There are technical and non-technical explanations for such a
great difference127. However, of a particular concern was the fact that the statistical
differences led to increasing frictions later on between the two countries128.
Both sides in the 1980s recognized the rapid growth that had taken in their commercial
relationship since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979-an annual average growth rate
of 44%. The controversy over bilateral trade imbalance calls for an analysis of a complex array of
local, regional and international factors. The disagreements over the size and causes of deficit
originated in a number of areas: the two sides’ different accounting approaches to re-exports to
and from China via Hong Kong; US policy constraints on exports to china; the role of foreign
firms in China; the multinational trade in commercial services; and global outsourcing and capital
flows in the increasingly interdependent East Asian and world economy129.
Secondly, while trade with China from 1971 to 1980 never amounted to more
than 1% of total US trade worldwide, the percentage doubled from 1.1% in 1981 to 2.2%
in 1990. These figures showed that the two countries became increasingly interdependent
in that period. Moreover, while the Sino-American rapprochement had no immediate
impacts on the bilateral trade during the first decade (1971-1980), things changed
remarkably and “economic factors had assumed a weight that both sides could no longer
discount”130.
3. China-US Trade Relation: 1991-2012
There have been a great deal of changes during the last two decades, notably, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991), China accession to WTO (2001), 9/11 event
(2001) and the global economic downturn (2008). The post-1992 was also known as the
time of deep reform of Chinese economy under Juang Zemin. With a remarkable
economic growth rate of China, especially since the country was granted WTO
membership in 2001, the trade relationship between Washington and Beijing became
much stronger despite a setback in 1990s. With the collapse of the common threat of the
Soviet Union, there were no geo-strategic reasons to sustain cooperation between
Washington and Beijing131. “But even at the time when the economic relations were at
127 Martin, Michael, F. What’s the Difference? Comparing US and Chinese Trade Data. Congressional
Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, 2013.
128 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.179.
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low ebb, trade volume rose despite of frictions and disputes”132. More importantly, by
2005, the center of Asian regional production network “had completely shifted to China,
pushing the United States and Japan to the periphery. China became the core market for
immediate products, from which final consumption goods were produced for export to
the United States and to European countries”133. Moreover, the production systems in the
Asia-US region has been characterized by structural diversity and a high degree of
complementarity in which American economy is matured and advanced while China
which specializes on low-skill jobs, is definitely not in the same camp of development.
This complementarity serves as both cause and a result of deepening economic ties
between countries in Asia inclusive of China and Asia power of the US134.
This period (1990-2012) suggested the following trends. Firstly, the collected data
reflected growing interdependence between the two largest economies in the world.
Trade with China, during this period, took up a considerable portion of total US trade
worldwide, up to 14% in 2009, showing the growing importance of China to the US
market. Secondly, “since joining WTO in 2001, China’s international exports have
increased more rapidly than its exports to the US”135. This trend not only reflected
China’s tendency to diversify its markets but also its avoidance of being heavily
dependence on the US market136. Thirdly, of a particular concern was the alarming trade
deficit between the two countries. As presented in Table 5 and 7, the US ran a trade
deficit with China which accelerated from US$ 12.7 billion in 1991 to US$ 311.053
billion  in 2012, roughly 30 times increase over two decades.
In summary, first steps to renew the commercial activities between the US and
China were taken in early 1971. The re-establishment with China was merely based on
geo-political considerations and driven by complex relationship between US-Soviet
Union and Soviet Union-China rivalries. However, after 10 years since re-establishment,
132 Sengupta. ‘Economic Relations between the US and Two Asian Giants’, p. 104
133 World Trade Organization, ‘Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: From Trade in Goods
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the situation changed remarkably in which economic factors had assumed a weight that
both sides could no longer discount. At first, China was much more dependent on the US
market for its economic growth. Along with its comprehensive reforms, especially since
it joined the WTO in 2001, the economic interdependence between the two sides has
been observed increasing at remarkably high speed. All collected data have shown the
increasing importance of Washington to American prosperity in recent decades.
Currently, there is no doubt that “American prosperity and global influence increasingly
depend on decisions made in Beijing”137. One of the most significant characteristics of
Sino-American trade relationship, perhaps, is a steadily growing trade imbalance between
these two Pacific nations. “Initially the balance in China’s favor was small, but it now
constitutes US’s single largest bilateral trade deficit”138. There are different explanations
for this growing imbalances139 and Chinese currency policy, which shall be discussed in
detail later on, has been blamed as one of them.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SINO-AMERICAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT
1. US Investment in China
Since China has carried out major economic reforms, there saw a massive
increasing number of American companies hurried to set up business in this giant market
either by forming joint-ventures with a Chinese company or a government agency140.
“Early participants included H. J. Heinz; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco; Coca-cola; American
Express; American Motors; AMF, Inc.; General Foods; Beatrice; Gillette; Pepsi-Cola;
Eastman Kodak; AT&T; Nabisco; and Bell South”141. American companies’ cumulative
137 Shirk. China: Fragile Superpower, p. 249
138 Lardy, Nicholas, R. ‘China: The Great New Economic Challenge?’
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140 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.177
141 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.178
37
direct investments in China, through the end of 2013, made roughly US$ 45 billion,
which was far more remarkable than those of any other emerging markets142.
China has received the largest FDI amount among developing countries with a
total amount of US$854 million by 2008. It is unquestionable that this country has
benefited enormously from FDI more than any countries worldwide. In 2010 alone, the
total amount of FDI flowing into China stood at US$ 105.7 billion, a remarkable rise
from 2009’s US$ 90 billion143. As could be observed from Table 8, American cumulative
FDI in China saw a constant increase from US$ 11,140 million in 2000 to US$ 60,425
million  in 2010 (stock). Remarkably, the figure saw an increase of 22% in two
consecutive years of 2009-2010. This, however, constituted only 1.7% of the total
American FDI abroad144. Overall, American FDI flows to this giant market remained
extremely modest. Additionally, collected data from both Washington and Beijing
showed that FDI from the US constituted only small part of the total FDI in China145.
Just as American firms collectively account for a relatively small component of FDI in China,
American investment in China accounts for a relatively small portion of total US multinational
activity around the world…total assets, sales and employment of US affiliates in China and in four
regions that are the major destinations of US FDI. China’s share of US MNE (multinational
enterprise) total affiliate sales and assets were 1.9% and 0.7%, respectively, in 2004. Although the
compound annual growth rate of US MNE sales in China over the 1982-2004 period exceeds 40%,
this rapid growth has proceeded from a small base, and it has taken place in a context of growing
multinational activity worldwide146
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These collected data may not reflect the real picture of American FDI in China.
Firstly, the statistics did not show up the re-investment amount from US companies.
Secondly, collected data did not reflect the investment from unnamed investors through
tax havens such as Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. Although
these tax havens are in the top-ten list of investors to China, they are actually not the
original source of the investment147. However, as data collected on an annual basis shows
the otherwise, there are reasons to believe the assumption that US investment in China is
large can be considered as one of fallacies in Sino-American economic relations148
2. Chinese Investment in the US
Beijing’s investment in the US can be categorized into two groups: holding of US
securities and FDI149. China’s holding of US securities has been significant which totaled
US$ 1.7 trillion by June 2011 inclusive of US Treasury securities, US government
agency security, corporate securities, and equities. In addition, the country overtook
Japan to be the largest holder of American securities in 2009. More significantly, US
treasury securities, which are used to finance budget deficit by the federal government,
constitute the largest category of US securities held by China. China’s holding of
American treasury securities saw a massive increase in 2003-2010 period, both in terms
of dollar and percentage of total foreign investment, and reached up to US$ 14.3 trillion
by the end of March, 2011150.
As shown at table 9, the total Chinese non-bond investment in the US was
comparatively small. Beijing’s cumulative FDI (stock) in Washington experienced a
gradual increase from a small base of US$ 503.32 million in 2003 to US$ 4,873.99
million in 2010. According to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, in 2009, China
ranked as the 34th largest FDI investor to the US151, a relatively low position given their
bilateral enormous economic potentials. Several analysts insist that Beijing often uses tax
havens to invest in other countries; therefore, the collected data did not reflect the overall
147 ‘Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’ (2011), p. 51
148 For additional information, see Branstetter, and Foley. ‘Facts and Fallacies about US FDI in China’.
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picture of Chinese FDI flows to the US152. However, Chinese outward foreign
investment, actually, “pales in comparison to inward investment” because “policies
encouraging outward foreign investment are far more recent than those encouraging
foreign investment in China”153
In short, US investment in China and China investment in the US remain
comparatively small given their huge economic potentials. The most prominent
characteristic of Sino-American investment is, presumably, China’s holding of US
securities which shall also be discussed in detail in this research. More interestingly, the
interdependence of the US and China quickly came to depend on investment flows,
specifically China’s holding of US securities, at least as much as trade flows, notably
American large trade deficit with China. As noted earlier, these two characteristics lead
these two great powers into the so-called “balance of financial terror” and make Sino-
American economic interdependence a very important topic for discussion.
III. RECENT SINO-AMERICAN TRADE DISPUTES
The following section is devoted to discuss three trade issues emerging from
economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing: American trade deficit,
Chinese currency valuation and China’s holdings of US treasury securities. In fact, their
strong economic ties have created a great number of trade issues154, these three are
chosen because of their relevance toward the arguments put forward by skeptics of the
pacifying effects of economic interdependence on armed conflicts. Although these three
issues have triggered considerable controversies, this section, however, attempts to
provide a general picture of the issues. The controversial discussions over these frictions
shall be discussed later on to provide better understanding of Sino-American economics-
security nexus.
1. Trade deficit
China has run a trade surplus with the US which is clearly shown in data collected
by both Beijing and Washington155. According to US statistics, Washington has incurred
152 ‘Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’ (2011), p. 56
153 ‘Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’ (2011), p. 55.
154 For additional information, see Morrison, Wayne M. ‘China-US Trade Issues’. Congressional Research
Service ,2013, 7-5700, RL 33536 and Dumbaugh, Kerry. ‘China-US Relations: Current Issues and
Implications for US Policy’. Congressional Research Service, 2009, 7-5700, R40457
155 See Tables 1 to 7.
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a trade deficit with China since 1983. According to Chinese figures, however, China has
run a trade surplus with the US since 1993. In addition, with the exceptions of 1979 and
1980, there has been no consistency between two sets of figures recorded by the two
countries. In 1983, for example, according to American data, Washington ran a trade
deficit at US$ 68 million. The figures were US$ 22.8 million and US$ 311 million in
1993 and 2012 respectively. Meanwhile, as collected by China, Beijing had a trade deficit
at roughly US$ 600 million in 1983 and a trade surplus at US$ 6.28 million and US$
224.129 million with Washington in 1993 and 2012 respectively. More significantly, in
2006, China surpassed Japan to become a country having the largest trade surplus with
the US, making itself the greatest challenge to America’s economic superiority156.
Specifically, “the deficit with China was the largest with any country or group of
countries in an overall US trade deficit”157.
Although the actual size of the US-China trade deficit still remains unclear, China
has been running an overall trade surplus with the US which has been growing over time
with remarkably high speed and has caused considerable frictions between the two sides.
2. Chinese Currency Valuation
Criticism in the United States over China’s currency policy emerged in recent years against the
background of the massive and growing US trade deficit with China and complaints from US
manufacturing firms and workers over competitive challenges posed by Chinese imports that
benefit from the Chinese currency’s value relative to the US dollar158
Specifically, China’s decision to keep the value of its currency low with respect to
the US dollar has emerged great concern among policy-makers, businesses and labor
groups. China has fixed the yuan to the US dollar at a rate of 8.28 RMB to the dollar
from 1994 to 2004159. China has implemented the exchange rate reform by allowing its
currency to “float within a specified range against a basket of currencies” since July
2005160. For China, its reform has increased the real effective exchange rate by roughly
156 Liew, Leong. H. ‘US Trade Deficits and Sino-US Relations’, Department of International Business &
Asian Studies, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia, 2010., pp.4-8.
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30% and the rate “has reached a level of equilibrium”161. Given Chinese increasing
reserves of foreign currency, for a Chinese government think tank, it is possible that the
value of the yuan will continue to increase further in 2013. However, for Washington, the
yuan remains significantly undervalued162, therefore, this issue remains a source of
tension between the two sides.
3. China’s holding of US securities
Chinese policy of maintaining its currency low with respective to the USD and
other currencies has turned the country to the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves,
especially the US dollar163. China’s holding of US securities has been significant which
totaled US$ 1.7 trillion by June 2011 inclusive of US Treasury securities, US government
agency security, corporate securities, and equities164. More significantly, US treasury
securities, which are used to finance budget deficit by the federal government, constitute
the largest category of US securities held by China165. “China’s holding of treasury
securities increased from $118 billion in 2002 to nearly $1,161 billion in 2010, and its
share of total foreign holding of US Treasury securities increased from 9.6% to 26.1%,
making China the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities”166. In fact, a number
of observers fear that China’s holding of US securities provides this Asian giant with a
big advantage over the American economy because China can manipulate American
policies by threatening to sell its dollar reserves. This assumption has emerged one of the
most serious trade disputes between Washington and Beijing.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RELEVANCE OF THEORIES TO
SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMICS-SECURITY NEXUS
-------------------------
This chapter addresses the research question: Can strong economic
interdependence deter the two countries from entering armed conflicts against each
other? Three propositions will be tested inclusive of trade increases conflict, trade
decreases conflict and trade is irrelevant to conflict.
I. PROPOSITION 1: TRADE INCREASES CONFLICT.
Marxist-Leninist and neo-realist theorists have put forward two arguments to
support the assumption that trade increases conflict. Firstly, they claim that the power
from asymmetric interdependence may be used by the more powerful state to coerce or
manipulate its trading partner. Since such extensive economic dependence poses
challenges to the national autonomy, it can trigger efforts to break the dependent ties167.
Secondly, states, in anarchy fear that the benefits of joint gains that advantage a trading
partner might produce a more dangerous potential enemy. More importantly, while
relative gains may not matter when state is engaged into business transactions with its
allies or a relatively weak state, they do heighten considerable concerns when state is in a
trading transaction with a relatively equal power or those who are potential to be an equal
power. As a result, the gains from trade can be converted to security concerns.168
Are these two arguments applicable to Sino-American economics-security nexus?
The first argument can be divided into two small parts: power from asymmetric
interdependence and efforts to break dependent ties. To be more specific, two sub-
questions needs to be addressed: firstly, are the two countries engaged into a trade
asymmetry; secondly, are there any efforts to break the dependency ties from Washington
or Beijing? Furthermore, for the second argument, one single question needs to be
answered: how much do relative gains matter to the US and China?
167 Barbieri. ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?’, p.32
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As perfect symmetry rarely exists, there is always the involvement of a potential
power relationship in most cases of economic interdependence169. As discussed earlier,
Washington and Beijing are trapped into the so-called “balance of financial terror”,
therefore, it needs more research and wide range of indicators to be ascertain which
country is more powerful in this special economic relationship. This section, hence, shall
examine only one part of the first argument. I find that there have been not yet any efforts
to break the economic ties from both Washington and Beijing. Concerning the second
argument, relative gains do matter and create some sources of frictions in Sino-American
economic relationship, these frictions will not trigger into armed conflicts as long as trade
is beneficial to both countries.
1. Argument 1: Both countries do not want to break their economic ties
In the 1980s, Washington became dependent on capital flows from Tokyo to
maintain the balance in its federal government budget when President Reagan cut taxes
and increased expenditure. Observers, at that time, worried that such dependence could
provide Japan enormous power over the US. These observers, however, looked at only
one side of the coin. Japan, at the same time, needed Washington for its continued
growth. To be more specific, the US market was extremely crucial for Japan’s exports. In
other words, Washington and Tokyo engaged into strong economic interdependence and
they both needed each other for further prosperity170.
Currently, a similar situation is applicable to Washington and Beijing because of
the concerns over China’s holding of US securities.
On one hand, US government leaders and other Americans encourage Chinese investment in such
US securities as a means for the United States to meet its investment needs and to fund the large
US federal budget deficit. One the other hand, US policy makers raise concerns that Chinese
investment could give China increased leverage over the United States on major economic or other
issues171
China’s holding of US securities, definitely, provides this Asian state a
tremendous advantage over the US. Specifically, China can use its dollar reserves as a
169 Nye, Joseph, Samuel. Jr. ‘American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis’. The Washington
Quarterly. Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010, pp. 143-153, pp.146-9
170 Nye ‘American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis’, p. 147.
171 Sutter. US-Chinese Relation: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present p.200
44
weapon to manipulate US polices172. In addition, for several scholars, Chinese substantial
dollar reserves can be considered as a great shift in the balance of power173 because
“China could bring the US to its knees by threatening to sell its dollars”174. However, the
story is not so simple. Doing so, China would face two disasters: firstly, the value of its
reserves would fall significantly; secondly, the US would possibly stop importing cheap
Chinese goods leading to China’s massive job loss and instability175 given that much of
Chinese economy is still focused on exports despites recent attempts to stimulate
domestic consumption in China itself176. In other words, “if it dumped its dollars, China
would bring the US to its knees, but might also bring itself to its ankles”177. In short,
Beijing needs a prosperous Washington for its continued growth. Instead of destroying
American economy, China has to “invest in its (American) continued expansion” because
it is “unable to disentangle its interests from those of the United States”178.
As the matter of fact, evidence has shown that neither Washington nor Beijing is
willing to destroy the economic ties that lock them together. They are now in a situation
which is similar to the military interdependence between the US and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War in which each side had the potential to destroy the other but never
did179.
In February 2010, angered over US arms sales to Taiwan, a group of senior military officers
called for the Chinese government to sell off US government bonds in retaliation, but their
suggestion was not heeded. Instead, Yi Gang, China’s director of state administration of foreign
exchange explained that “Chinese investments in US Treasuries are market investment behavior
and we don’t wish to politicize them. If they did, the pain would be mutual180
What can be observed from the story of China’s holding of US securities? While
China can use its dollar reserves as weapons to manipulate US policies, the country needs
a prosperous America for its continued economic growth. In addition, the pain would be
172 Beckley. ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure, p.47.
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mutual for both countries if one tried to break the dependency ties. More importantly,
both the two countries are not willing to destroy the economic ties that lock them
together. Simply put, Sino-American strong economic ties create some sources of
frictions while at the same time, deter these frictions to trigger into armed conflicts
between the two sides.
2. Argument 2: Concerns over Relative Gains Cannot Turn into a Sino-
American Armed Conflict
In this section, I will discuss the concerns over relative gains in Sino-American
economic relations by looking at two stories of Chinese currency devaluation and
American large trade deficit with China.
Firstly, the policy of a weak currency has aroused great concerns over Chinese
relative gains in respect with America’s. For critics, a weak yuan has produced great
advantage for China by making its exports to Washington cheaper and American exports
to Beijing more expensive than they would be if China maintained a market-based
floating exchange rate. Additionally, a weak currency has seriously hurt American
manufacturers (such as textiles, furniture, steel, etc) by making their products less
competitive against Chinese low-cost imports181. More importantly, China’s weak
currency also adds “to the size and growth of the US trade deficit with China”.182
Secondly, realist scholars have insisted that the massive trade deficit with China
disadvantages the US. In recent years, although the trade deficit with China showed signs
of decline as a result of US economic recession, the decline itself hardly puts an end to
long-standing complaints by a great number of American Congressmen, media and
interest groups183. Because of its huge deficit, the US needs to continue either borrowing
from abroad or selling off capital assets to finance its consumption of goods and services.
While continual borrowing from other countries is not a durable strategy, selling off
capital assets can harm production. More importantly, jobs will be lost to overseas
workers when imports exceed exports184. Chinese unfair and disadvantageous trade
181 Sutter. US-Chinese Relation: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present p.204.
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policies have been blamed for this increasingly massive trade deficit185. Although the
actual size of the US-China trade deficit still remains unclear, China has been running an
overall trade surplus with the US which has been growing over time with remarkably
high speed and has caused considerable frictions between the two sides.
The realist theory of relative gains is challenged by liberal notion of absolute
gains. For liberal scholars, “pursuit of relative gain is misleading and destructive to the
global economy and a hindrance to cooperation among states”186. In the next section, I
will develop three arguments to prove that concerns over relative gains in Sino-American
economic relationship are misleading and destructive.
Firstly, for the advocates of Chinese currency policy, a weak yuan is beneficial to
American prosperity. Cheap Chinese imports lower “prices for US customers and
dampens inflationary pressures”187. Moreover, a weak yuan allows American
manufacturers to be more globally competitive because they can use imported Chinese
inputs for their production188. In addition, critics of Chinese managed currency while
overstates the role of a weak currency in surging China’s exports ahead, ignores other
factors such as low wage costs, highly skilled labor force and low cost of industrial
finance189. More importantly, as argued by Chinese officials, Chinese managed currency
is meant for boosting domestic economic stability190.
In the medium to long terms…China is expected to continue to slowly appreciate its currency and
loosen capital controls…The long-term pressure to appreciate the RMB is more likely to emanate
from within China than from the United States or any other foreign power. This is in part because
China’s growing consumer class will demand more buying power to purchase both domestic and
imported goods. And, perhaps more important, domestic firms will be less competitive abroad as
prices within China rise without a commensurate appreciate in the RMB (the yuan) relative to
foreign currencies. In addition, the gradual emergence of a large and more affluent middle
class…could benefit the United States191
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Secondly, as discussed, the center of Asian regional production network has
completely shifted to China since 2005, making the country the core market for
immediate products and an assembling factory of the world. This feature makes the story
of American massive trade deficit even more interesting one because the US saw an
increase in trade deficit with China while experienced a decrease in trade deficit with
other East Asian nations
East Asia’s share of the US trade deficit actually declined from 1998 to 2007 (from 75 to 49
percent), as many East Asian nations shifted their exports toward China and their trade deficits
with the United States decreased as a result192.
Again, other factors need to be taken into account when considering the US huge
trade deficit with China. To start with, “most scholars argue that the competitiveness of
US products and services are the crucial factors for reduction of trade deficit between the
two countries”193. In addtition, the US government trade restrictions should be considered
as another contributor to such a deficit. For example, in 2003, China imported a variety of
high-technology products from the US inclusive of aircraft, nuclear reactors, machineries
and equipments with a value of US$ 10.6 million, accounting up to 40% of the US
exports. This significant amount, however, only constituted 10% of China’s total high-
tech imports. The US trade barriers, therefore, contributed to increase the problematic
trade deficit for Washington194.
Thirdly, absolute gains195 in trade and economic relations should be considered in
Sino-American economic relationship. It is undeniable that Washington has received
enormous benefits from its trade with China. “Chinese goods helped US fight inflation
because cheap imports held domestic prices down by offering competition and they also
allowed Americans to enjoy a high consumption standard”196. Furthermore, American
companies become more globally competitive because they choose China to assemble
their products or use Chinese-made inputs for their productions197. More importantly, the
US and Chinese economies are complementary to, rather than, competing with each other
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because of their different cost structure and comparative advantages198. The US has
comparative advantages in capital, technology and high quality human resources while
those of China constitute its large population, unlimited low cost labor and abundance of
natural resources199. The percentage of imports from China which compete directly with
US-made products, according to a 1999 study, was not high, at only 10%. In addition,
Chinese products have replaced those from other low-wage countries such as East and
Southeast Asia to America200. China has run a huge trade surplus with the US for a long
time.  Most of its exports, however, “are low value added labor intensive products and
produced by multinational corporations and especially US multinational firms”201.
Concerning its high-technology exports, it has not known yet how much China really gets
from its export growth. To be more specific, the percentage of imported component for
China’s high-technology exports have increased over time, “a trend that suggests Chinese
firms are falling further behind foreign competitors”202 and a considerable amount of the
benefits from export-driven growth have been located outside China203.
Simply put, what can be observed from the stories of trade deficits and weak
currency? Clearly, when it comes to trading relation between rivalries, especially
between dyad of relatively equal powers, relative gains do matter and create some
sources of serious security concerns. In the long run, however, there is no question that
Sino-American trade relationship will benefit both countries. As long as their bilateral
trade is beneficial to both sides, the concerns over relative gains cannot turn into an
armed conflict between Washington and Beijing.
II. PROPOSITION 2: TRADE DECREASES CONFLICT.
As discussed in chapter 1, economic interdependence, as described by liberal
theorists, lowers the possibility of war by increasing the value of trade over the
alternative of aggression and making wars costly between states, especially those with a
high level of economic interdependence. Conflict between trading partners, therefore, is
less likely to occur between pairs of states that do not trade. More remarkably, partners
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who have an increasing amount of trade volume should be more concerned with avoiding
conflict, in comparison with those which are not increasing their trading activities204. I
found out that although high level of economic interdependence does help dampen any
tendencies toward an armed conflict, strong economic ties are not sufficient enough to
create lasting stability between Washington and Beijing. The next section, therefore, is in
two parts. The first part is devoted to the examination of how relevant the five arguments
of advocates are to the Sino-American economics-security nexus. The second part
presents grounds for skepticism or flaws of these arguments.
1. The relevance of five liberalist arguments to Sino-American economics-
security nexus
1.1. Argument 1: Trade decreases conflict because it is beneficial to all trading
states
Firstly, liberalist theorists assume that states participates in trading activities
voluntarily because trade benefits them all. States, for liberalist scholars, obtain benefits
through exchanges and greater specification, therefore, become richer. Specifically,
through trade, states exchange products by selling and buying things with cheaper prices,
thus, gain revenue and boost consumption205. Furthermore, trade also helps states to
specialize in goods and services which they hold comparative advantages206, therefore,
increase states’ economic efficiency. Due to the gains from trade, states shall avoid any
possibility of conflict.
This argument is applicable to Sino-American conflict. As discussed, the two
countries have enjoyed tremendous benefits from trading with each other. In addition, the
two economies are complementary to, rather than competing with each other. While the
US has advantages in capital, technology and high quality human resources, China has a
large population, unlimited low cost labor and abundance of natural resource207.
Moreover, China specializes in low value added labor intensive products and this
204 Rapkin, David, P. and Thompson, William, R. ‘Will Economic Interdependence Encourage China’s and
India’s Peaceful Ascent? Strategic Asia 2006-7, p.343
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specialization has increased since 1995208, therefore, imports from China can hardly
compete with American made high-value added products209. In short, as trade is mutually
beneficial to both Washington and Beijing, the two sides undoubtedly shall avoid conflict
and secure peaceful environment to prosper their economic relationship.
1.2. Argument 2: Trade decreases conflict because there is a strong desire to
avoid conflict from the sub-systemic/domestic level
Secondly, another argument supporting the conflict-suppressing of economic
interdependence explains the proposition “trade promotes conflict” at domestic level.
Accordingly, the greater the volume of trade and investment flowing between two
countries, the more people on both sides should have a strong desire to avoid conflict.
This argument is true to Sino-American relationship. In fact, these two largest economies
are connected so tightly that they are known as a single organism of “Chimerica”210.
Chimerica makes up only 13% of the world in terms of size, “but a quarter of its
population and fully a third its GDP”211.
Given the massive gains from trade as well as the prospects of more benefits in
the future, it is no surprise to see governments of both Washington and Beijing are
currently under great pressure to secure mutual peace by different actors who benefit
enormously from trade. For the political and business elite, a stable and cooperative Sino-
American relationship is crucial for the national prosperity of both sides and their
personal well-being212.
China is currently the United States’ second largest trading partner, its third largest export market,
and its biggest source of imports. According to one estimate, China is currently a 250 billion USD
market for US firms…China’s large population and booming economy have made it a large and
growing market for US exporters and investors. Many US firms view participation in China’s
market as critical to staying globally competitive213.
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More importantly, thanks to trade, many Americans, notably American business
interest groups, see China’s rise as opportunities not only dangers214. Meanwhile, if not
for trade, ‘some in China would feel even more threatened by America’s
preponderance”215. This argument, thus, is clearly obvious and “at least for the moment,
leading figures in both countries do not appear to need much convincing on these
points”216.
1.3. Argument 3: Trade decreases conflict because it is a more efficient mean
for creating wealth and influence
Thirdly, another argument attributing the inverse relationship between trade and
conflict is that trade now plays an increasingly more efficient means for creating wealth
and influence than the old method of military conquest and external expansion. In this
section, I will point out three reasons to explain why this argument is relevant to Sino-
American relationship.
To begin with, recent trends have offered strong evidence that war has almost
ceased to exist217. More importantly, there has seen fewer and less deadly international
conflicts218. In addition, the incentives for aggression to gain economic benefits from
conquered territories have actually decreased over time. The most reasonable explanation
for this decrease is due to the recent shift in “the most modern countries from economies
based on land to ones primarily based on human capital”219 or knowledge-based
economies220. While America has successfully transformed toward a knowledge-based
economy, China encountered a number of great difficulties and has not yet achieved
relevant economic and social foundation for such an economy due to, presumably, its
weakness in high-tech innovation221. However, Beijing has obtained enormous benefits
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215 Friedberg. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 46
216 Friedberg. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, p. 46
217 For additional information, see Mueller, John. ‘War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment’.
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No. 2, 2009, pp. 297-321.
218 For additional information, see Human Security Report 2009-10. Why International Wars Are
Increasingly Rare, pp. 21-35.
219 Brooks, Stephen, G. ‘The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest’. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5,1999,  pp.646-670, p. 655.
220 Detailed discussion on reasons why shift to knowledge-based could lower benefits of conquest could be
found in Brooks. ‘The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest’.
221 For additional information, see Zhongqing, Tian. The knowledge-based economy in China: perceptions
and facts. Retrieved from: epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ch076.pdf
52
from the current international order and governance. The country would find ways to
satisfy its growing weight, values and interests but not a revolutionary states trying to
overthrow the current international system222. Finally, as discussed, trade provides both
Washington and Beijing great benefits, therefore, makes the two countries, especially
China, richer proving it an efficient mean for creating influence.
China’s wealth changes America’s relationship with it because the old saying is right: ultimately,
wealth is power. America itself has shown this to be true, with its global power built on its
economic preponderance. Now China’s swift economic rise is driving a rapid shift in relative
strategic and political power223.
1.4. Argument 4: Trade decreases conflict because the lost benefits associated
with trade interruption are taken into leaders’ calculation
Fourthly, those who insist that economic interdependence deters intense form of
conflict when leaders consider the lost benefits associated with trade interruption. In
other words, it is not trading activities but fear of losing economic benefits that prevent
states from starting wars against their major trading partners224.
At the first glance, this argument is true to Washington and Beijing. An
interruption to trade between these two Pacific nations would be unimaginable.
Undoubtedly, Sino-American trade interruption would drown hundreds of foreign trade-
related industries, increase bad debts, leave tens of thousands of American unemployed in
a short time, force tens of thousands of Chinese migrant worker to return home, drop
household consumption substantially, and escalate American debt crisis rapidly225. Given
the tremendous benefits from their economic relationship and damaging consequences in
case of trade termination between the two, it is undeniable that leaders of both sides
would be very much affected by concerns over the future economic loss in case of armed
conflict. The most outstanding example could be American concerns over a rising China
which poses challenges to American dominance in the world. However, it is even hard
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for Washington to apply containment226, a successful policy against the Soviet Union, to
China because of the massive economic interdependence between the two sides227, not
mentioned a war. For Beijing, it has made considerable efforts to minimize the impact of
national uprisings to maintain stable Sino-US relations in case of US bombing of its
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the reconnaissance plane incident in 2001228.
In short, Washington “welcomes the continuing peaceful rise of China as a world
power and that, in fact, it is in the United States’ interest that China continues on the path
of success, because we (the US) believe that a peaceful and stable and prosperous China
is not only good for Chinese but also good for the world and for the United States”229.
Meanwhile, for China, the two countries “have vast convergence of shared interests, from
promoting our respective economic growth at home to ensuring the stability of the global
economy; from addressing international and regional hotspot issues to dealing with all
kinds of global challenges. On all these issues, our two countries need to increase
exchanges and cooperation”230.
1.5. Argument 5: Trade decreases conflict because there are a convergence of
national interest and spill-over effects231.
Finally, economic interdependence is assumed to be linked and intertwined with
economic and political structures of states which results in the convergence of national
interests. Specifically, the stronger and closer commercial linkages among states are, the
more cooperative they will be in other areas. As a result, there shall emerge a number of
institutions, both formal and informal to foster trade and have spillover effects in other
fields.
At the first glance, this argument seems fit the Sino-American relationship. There
is a convergence of national interests between Washington and Beijing, which is to
maintain a strong economic relationship with each other. Both sides have strong
226 The action or policy of preventing the expansion of a hostile country or influence
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motivation for expanding its economic ties with each other because trade has provided
Washington tremendous benefits and also brought prosperity and technical advancement
to China232. Additionally, it is undeniable that both sides would be badly affected if the
US intentionally hampered the economic development of China233.
A prosperous China is crucial for a wealthy America. However, it is wealth and
technical advancement which have enhanced Chinese military capability. And there is no
doubt that China will continue to spend more on defense unless its economy collapses.
Meanwhile, a weak economy would limit Washington’s capability to increase its military
budget and ease the strategic pressure on China. However, it would also hamper the
economic development of Beijing because China still needs to be able to sell its goods to
the United States to remain afloat. The two countries, therefore, are trapped in both
positive and negative factors which are closely interwoven and often run into one
another234.
Furthermore, strong Sino-American economic interactions have also resulted in
further cooperation in other fields. In reality, Washington and Beijing are not only bound
together by the discussed commercial ties but also by cultural, societal and scientific
linkages235. For example, the number of Chinese students studying in the US soared from
roughly 1,000 in 1979-80 to more than 60,000 in 2002. Meanwhile, the figures of
American students studying in China increased remarkably from zero to roughly 5,000
during the same period236. More remarkably, he population of Chinese students in the US
keeps growing and constitutes up to 25% of all international students in the United States
in the school year of 2011-2012237. In addition, child adoption is another example of
close social connections with over 5,000 Chinese children adopted by American families
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in 2000 alone238. Also, steady currents of scientists and other professionals for research
collaboration, professional meetings, view sharing and frequent exchanges of culture and
athletes, sister-cities, etc have greatly contributed to strengthen the social and cultural
linkages239. Moreover, Washington and Beijing has also furthered their cooperation in
dealing with non-traditional securities issues such as terrorism, energy security and
climate change240.
Simply put, the examination of the five liberalist arguments to Sino-American
relationship has shown that all arguments, to some extent, fit the case studies. In fact, it is
undeniable that a high level of economic interdependence has bound these two Pacific
nations together and helped to create a relative peaceful environment for Washington and
Beijing to prosper. However, there are grounds for skepticism. Firstly, governments are
not, as a matter of fact, always deterred by the prospect of future economic loss.
Secondly, it is not yet certain that mutual linkages of all kinds can damper intense forms
of conflict. Thirdly, as discussed in proposition 2, economic interdependence can be a
source of frictions. The following section is devoted to discuss all these three points.
2. Grounds for skepticism
There is no doubt that the remarkably strong economic interaction have served as
one of the most important factors contributing to the relative stability between
Washington and Beijing for the last several decades. However, high levels of economic
interdependence cannot explain many recent incidents of China pushing back against the
US. The following section is, therefore, devoted to discuss three grounds for skepticism.
2.1. Argument 1: Leaders are not always deterred by the prospects of economic
loss
Firstly, government, unfortunately, are not always deterred by the future
economic loss. Since leaders usually assume, mistakenly, that the effect of their decisions
will be short and minimally disruptive, they often underestimate the cost of their actions.
For some particular situations, even if leaders know for sure that their decisions will
seriously damage the material well-being of the most powerful interest groups or even an
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entire nation; they still put security concerns over economic ones. The most outstanding
example can be found in China-Taiwan relationship241. “China is bound even more
tightly by economic ties to Taiwan than it is to the US. Yet few observers doubt that
Beijing would use force to prevent moves toward independence, despite enormous direct
costs of doing so, to say nothing of the possibility of economic sanctions, limited
conventional conflict, and perhaps even a nuclear exchange with the United States”.242
2.2. Argument 2: Linkages cannot guarantee peace
Secondly, the presences of common interests and close linkages in different fields
certainly have their own roles in damper any tendencies toward an armed conflict.
The United States and China have developed a normal relationship, in which they cooperate on a
wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues....US-China ties have strengthened and
expanded…General speaking, common grounds and common interests far outweigh disputes and
disagreements between the United States and China243.
However, it is not yet certain that such linkages afford the guarantee that war can
be avoided. We then come back to the triangle relationship of the US, China and Taiwan.
The mutual strong ties of culture, society, science and even commerce certainly cannot
guarantee a Sino-American peaceful relationship if Washington were back Taiwanese
independence244.
2.3. Argument 3: There is historical evidence that economic interdependence
could not prevent war
Finally, as discussed in the previous scenario, economic interdependence can be a
cause of insecurity and friction. What brought Washington and Beijing together in early
1970 was not economic interdependence, but rather the convergence of national interests
emerged from the common threat of the Soviet Union. Since the demise of the Soviet
Union in early 1990s, economic interdependence while binds the two countries together,
becomes a major source of insecurity between the two sides. The discussed trade deficit,
currency valuation and China’s holding of US securities are outstanding example of how
interdependence can trigger great disagreements between Washington and Beijing.
However, these differences, as noted earlier, are not strong enough to trigger an armed
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conflict between the two sides. These discussions drive us to the last proposition: Trade is
irrelevant to conflict.
III. PROPOSITION 3: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IS
IRRELEVANT TO CONFLICT.
The third scenario is based on the offensive realist assumption that the causes of
war are based on political and military-strategic considerations rather than being either
advanced or hindered by purely economic ones. Specifically, trade may serve as a mean
to pursue the national interests which can easily be broken when states consider military
conflict options. I find that this proposition perfectly fits the complex Sino-American
economics-security relationship. This finding is based on three arguments concerning the
usage of trade, historical evidence and the existence of other factors which help to bind
the two countries together.
1. Argument 1: Trade is meant for other purposes
Firstly, Washington is not heavily dependent on the global economy for its
prosperity and influence because “exports and imports both represent a smaller
percentage of US gross domestic products than is the case in every other major economy
and most minor ones”245. The US dependency on the global market was mainly reflected
by its public debt “which because of unparalleled US power and the reserve currency role
of the dollar has permitted the US to accumulate so much external debt for so long that
the country is at-if not already beyond-the boundaries of prudent economic behavior”246.
The US extraordinary indebtedness reflects the American ability to make use of a
peculiar benefit of interdependence arising from the fact that foreign governments which
hold dollar reserves have no choice but to rely on US prosperity for their continued
economic growth247.
In such circumstances (creditors of the US have no choice but to finance the continuing US trade
deficits), the US dependence on trade, which is relatively modest to begin with, could have even
less of political restraining effect than might otherwise be case, which is arguably good news for
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the pursuit of US strategic objectives in Asia, especially when these embody some risk of conflict
with a country such as China248.
On contrary, official figures suggested that China’s export increased from 20% of
GDP in 2001 to roughly 40% in 2007. For some scholars, this “roughly 40% of GDP”
still underestimates the role of exports in Chinese economy, believing the figure can go
up to 50%249.  Simply put, this export-orientation growth can be seen as one of the most
important characteristics of China’s growth pattern which has driven the country to a
high level of dependence on the global economy for achieving high economic growth
rate.
More importantly, “export-led growth then becomes the instrumentality that
enables Beijing to keep the United States invested in strong economic links with China,
thereby hopefully dissuading Washington from constraining China’s rise”250. At the same
time, the economic miracle of China has created a web of interdependence that ties the
prosperity of China to both its rivals and friends. Therefore, for China, trade is meant for
two purposes. Firstly, trade is the fastest mean to increase its national wealth “which in
turn provides the state (China) with the resources required both to maintain the social
contract that preserves the state’s power and to secure those capabilities deemed
necessary to protect national interests”251. Secondly, trade also provides a strategic
instrument which can bind China and its rivals including the US “while concurrently
limiting the freedom of action of China’s regional neighbors, who presumably would be
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unwilling to bandwagon with countries that might imperil the source of their current
prosperity”252.
In short, these in-depth analyses have shown that, for China and the US, trade is
not used to suppress conflict but to maximize their national power. The behaviors of both
Washington and Beijing have reflected their profound understanding of the economic and
international political lessons253.
They (including the US and China) appreciate that robust economic growth alone enables them to
protect their states in the manner they deem desirable, that trade enables these states to expand
their national power faster in comparison to alternative national strategies, and that the growth in
power, which derives from both trade and internal resource mobilization, enables them to ward off
threats and manage risks while strengthening their ability to secure whatever strategic goals they
may happen to pursue254.
2. Argument 2: There are a great number of factors building up the Sino-
American peace
Secondly, looking back at history, there is little evidence to believe that economic
interdependence alone can bring lasting stability in the international order. For instance,
Britain and Germany were major trading partners before the First World War. Strong
economic linkages between the two sides and the prospects of economic loss, however,
failed to deter Britain’s leaders from seeing a rising Germany as a challenge to their
colonial empire255. Meanwhile, it also failed to prevent Germany from “concluding that
Britain was intent on retaining its preponderant position and blocking Germany’s rise”256.
In other words, the prospects of future massive economic loss did not stop the two
countries from entering in one of the most disastrous wars in human history.
Of course, we have not observed any dyad of major powers which have such a
high level of mutually dependence as it has been in the case of Sino-American economic
relationship257. The economic loss from a war between Washington and Beijing would be
definitely much more disastrous than it was in the case of Germany and Britain, not to
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mention the fact that they belong to the nuclear club. However, given the discussion
above, we know for sure that a high level of economic interdependence alone cannot
deter the two countries from intense form of conflict. As it was in the case of Britain and
Germany, “an assortment of factors-including bilateral economic relations; shifts in the
global distribution of power; developments in military technology; domestic political
processes; ideological trends; questions of radical, religious, cultural, and national
identity; the actions of key individuals; and the sequencing of critical events-combined to
lead Britain and Germany to the brink of World War I”258. The question of whether or not
the history will repeat itself in the case of Washington and Beijing, therefore, cannot be
limited only to the discussion on the impact of economic interdependence on interstate
relationship.
It is incorrect if one too quickly concludes that strong economic ties do not help to
dampen tendencies toward conflict. In fact, if not for trade, Washington and Beijing
could not have been as close as they were today. However, as discussed earlier, economic
interdependence alone is not sufficient to create lasting stability between these two most
powerful nations. What are the other factors which bring Washington and China to a
relatively stable relationship? There are, in fact, a number of factors such as the
emergence of common non-traditional threats, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons,
international institutions, democratization, etc which have contributed to the relatively
stable Sino-American relationship for the last several decades259.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
---------------------------------
In international relations, economic interdependence has two basic meanings.
Firstly, a group of countries is considered to be economically interdependent if changes
in one economy can seriously affect the others. Secondly, countries are considered to be
economically interdependent if it would be costly for them to terminate their trading
relationship. While the former corresponds to sensitivity interdependence, the later
corresponds to vulnerability interdependence. The differences of these two dimensions of
interdependence have been well noticed by scholars of international relations and even
economists. However, given its nature of obscurity and confusedness, sensitivity should
be retained but needs to change its label to something less misleading. Therefore,
interdependence should be corresponded with its clear, time-honored and still useful
dimension of vulnerability, defined as the opportunity costs of interrupting a trading
relationship.
This definition of economic interdependence fits the Sino-American relationship.
We have not seen any two major powers which have such strong economic ties in history.
And it is undeniable that it would be too costly for both Washington and Beijing in case
of trade interruption.
In this research, indicators of trade and investment have been used to measure
Sino-American economic interdependence. In terms of bilateral trade, Washington and
Beijing have observed increasing business transactions since the two countries
normalized their diplomatic relations in 1979. The most prominent feature of the trade
relationship between these two Pacific nations is a steadily growing trade imbalance.
China currently constitutes American largest bilateral trade deficit. In terms of bilateral
investment, the collected data is comparatively small given their huge economic
potentials. However, the interdependence of America and China quickly become to
depend on investment flows at least as much as trade flows because of China is now the
biggest holder of US securities. Simply put, economic factors have assumed a weight that
both sides could no longer discount. China is vital to American economic health. There is
no doubt that American prosperity greatly depends on decisions made in Beijing. Also,
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China needs the American market to remain afloat. In addition, China needs a strong US
economy because the slowdown in Washington can severely affects China development.
These two Pacific nations are trapped into the so-called balance of financial terror
because America is Chinese largest export market and China is American largest creditor.
It is no doubt that economic factors have greatly contributed to a relatively peaceful and
cooperative Sino-American relationship.
Three propositions have emerged from disputes over the vices and virtues of
economic interdependence on interstate relationship. All these three propositions are
examined in this research in order to address the research question: Can a high level of
economic interdependence serve as a deterrent to Sino-American armed conflict?
Firstly, an examination of the first proposition of “economic interdependence
increases conflict” has shown that the strong economic interaction has actually caused
tensions between the two Pacific nations. Trade issues of American’s large deficit with
China, Chinese currency devaluation and China’s holding of American securities are
among major issues. However, these issues of great disputes are not strong enough to turn
into war between Washington and Beijing because both countries are not willing to
destroy the economic ties that lock them together. If they did, the pain would be too
costly for both. Also, as long as trade is beneficial to both sides, concerns over relative
gains cannot trigger into war between the two sides.
Secondly, the proposition of “economic interdependence decreases conflict” is
also not relevant to the Sino-American relationship. Five arguments have been proposed
by liberalist theories to support the pacifying effect of trade. In fact, it is undeniable that
economic interdependence has greatly enhanced a relatively peaceful and cooperative
Sino-American relationship. In fact, if it were not because of a high level of
interdependence, the two countries would not be as close as they are today. However,
there are grounds for skepticism.  First, leaders always put the security concerns over the
prospects for economic loss, especially in times of insecurity and vulnerability. Second,
the convergence of national interests and different linkages between Washington and
Beijing have their own roles in leading both sides to a stable relation but it is not yet
certain that such linkages afford the guarantee that war can be avoided. Thirdly, Sino-
American interdependence is different from those in the past. However, we are not sure
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about their future because there is little evidence to believe that economic
interdependence alone can bring lasting stability in the international order.
Thirdly, the third proposition “economic interdependence is irrelevant to conflict”
perfectly fits the Sino-American relationship. There are two strong supporting points for
my conclusion. First, trade is not meant to suppress conflict but to maximize national
power for both Washington and Beijing. Second, the question of whether or not the two
countries will engage into a war against each other should not be limited only to the
discussion on economic interdependence. In other words, economic factors alone cannot
deter an armed conflict between Washington and Beijing. Furthermore, both sides have
kept their relationship relatively stable during the last several decades not only because of
their strong economic ties but also other factors such as: the emergence of common non-
traditional threats and the mutual possession of nuclear weapons.
This research suggests that the conflict-suppressing impact of economic
interdependence on Sino-American relationship has been exaggerated. Strong economic
ties contribute to the stability of the relationship between Washington and Beijing but
cannot guarantee it.
Then a question should be addressed: What does a high level of economic
interdependence mean for Washington and Beijing? Given its high level of economic
interdependence, what should Washington and Beijing do?
Firstly, both Washington and Beijing should not cling to the hope that trade can
promote peace but need to study the nature and context of economic linkages carefully260.
As long as they understand the factors which can deter intense form of conflict in trading
relations, they “will be better equipped to assess the potential impact of interdependence
and to identify those relationship that are most likely to maximize the benefits of
economic relationships, while minimizing the costs of economic relationship”261
Secondly, due to the changing structure of the global economy, nowadays, the
most powerful nations can hardly obtain the gains from trade as they used to be. The
concerns over the relative gains, therefore, can hamper cooperation between Washington
and Beijing because it is not about the total gain available but how the gains are shared.
260 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 126
261 Barbieri. The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?, p. 126
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As the matter of fact, “tensions over economic issues may increase as stakes of economic
policies become more critical”262. In the past, since the economic expansion allowed state
to enjoy greatly from trade, the concerns over relative gains might not be serious as it is
today. The global economic crisis may seriously heighten the concerns over relative gains
because of the assumption that now the economic pie is much smaller263. Therefore,
countries should understand the impact of increased interdependence and design policies
“to minimize the costs associated with interdependence, while also maximize its benefits.
They must also consider the overall context in which trading relationships are embedded
in evaluating whether it is desirable to expand dependence on any given state”264.
AFFIXES
Table 1265: Sino-American Trade, 1971-1980 (American Figures)
Year US Imports
from PRC
US Exports
to PRC
Total
Bilateral
Trade
US Trade
Balance
Percent of
Total US
Trade
Percent of
Total PRC
Trade
1971 4.7 0.0 4.7 -4.7 0.0 -
1972 32.2 60.2 92.4 28.0 0.1 -
1973 63.5 689.1 752.6 625.6 0.5 -
1974 114.4 806.9 921.2 692.5 0.4 -
1975 157.9 303.6 461.6 145.7 0.2 -
1976 201.5 134.4 335.9 -67.1 0.1 -
1977 200.7 171.3 372.1 -29.4 0.1 2.5
1978 324.0 820.7 1,114.6 496.7 0.3 5.4
1979 592.3 1,724.0 2,316.3 1,131.7 0.6 7.9
1980 1,058.3 3,754.4 4,812.7 2,696.1 1.0 12.7
Note: In millions of current US dollars (in the American system, 1 billion = 1,000 million, 1 trillion =
1,000 billion)
262 Barbieri. Liberal Illusion: Can Trade Promote Peace, p. 129
263 Barbieri. Liberal Illusion: Can Trade Promote Peace, p. 129
264 Barbieri. Liberal Illusion: Can Trade Promote Peace, p. 129
265 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p. 174
Year PRC Exports to
US
PRC Imports
from US
Total Bilateral
Trade
China Trade
Balance
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Table 2266: Sino-American Trade, 1971-1980 (Chinese Figures)
Note: In millions of current US dollars
Table 3267: Sino-American Trade, 1981-1990 (American Figures)
Year US Imports
from PRC
US Exports
to PRC
Total
Bilateral
Trade
US Trade
Balance
Percent of
Total US
Trade
Percent of
Total PRC
Trade
1981 1,865.3 3,602.7 5,468.0 1,737.4 1.1 12.7
1982 2,283.7 2,912.1 5,195.8 628.4 1.1 12.7
1983 2,244.1 2,176.1 4,420.2 -68.0 0.9 10.2
1984 3,064.8 3,004.0 6,068.8 -60.8 1.1 11.8
1985 3,861.7 3,851.7 7,713.4 -9.9 1.4 10.9
1986 4,770.9 3,105.4 7,876.3 -1,665.5 1.3 10.5
1987 6,293.5 3,488.4 9,781.8 -2,805.1 1.4 11.8
1988 8,512.2 5.022.9 13,535.1 -3,489.3 1.7 13.2
1989 11,988.5 5,807.4 17,795.9 -6,181.1 2.1 16.1
1990 15,223.9 4,807.3 20,031.2 -10,416.6 2.2 17.6
Note: In millions of current US dollars (in the American system, 1 billion = 1,000 million, 1 trillion =
1,000 billion)
Table 4268: Sino-American Trade, 1981-1990 (Chinese Figures)
Year PRC Exports to
US
PRC Imports
from US
Total Bilateral
Trade
China Trade
Balance
1981 1,505.79 4,382.53 5,888.32 -2,876.74
1982 1,619.25 3,716.75 5,336.00 -2,097.50
1983 1,720.17 2,321.67 4,041.84 -601.50
1984 2,299.71 3,663.38 5,963.09 -1,363.67
1985 2,651.71 4,373.36 7,024.96 -1,721.76
1986 2,466.43 3,527.09 5,9 93.25 -1,060.66
1987 2,962.66 3,809.36 6,772.02 -846.70
1988 3,209.96 5,651.93 8,261.89 -2,441.97
1989 4,410.00 7,860.00 12,270.00 -3,450.00
1990 6,580.00 5,190.00 11,770.00 -1,390.00
Note: In millions of current US dollars
Table 5269. Sino-American Trade, 1991-2009 (American Figures)
266 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p. 174
267 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.179
268 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.179.
269 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.186
1971 - - -
1972 9.6 3.30 12.90 6.30
1973 39.72 220.66 260.38 -180.94
1974 102.86 372.85 475.71 -269.99
1975 128.88 341.83 470.71 -212.95
1976 156.04 160.64 316.68 -4.60
1977 179.63 114.62 294.25 65.01
1978 270.60 721.10 991.70 -450.50
1979 595.01 1,856.59 2,451.60 -1,261.58
1980 981.06 3,830.21 4,811.27 -2,849.15
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Year US Imports
from
PRC/World
US Exports to
PRC/World
Total US-
China/US-
World Trade
US-China/US-
World Trade
Balance
Percent of
Total US
Trade
1991 19.0/488.2 6.3/421.9 25.6/910.1 -12.7/-66.3 2.8
1992 25.7/532.7 7.4/448.2 33.1/980.9 -18.3/84.5 3.4
1993 31.5/580.7 8.8/465.1 40.3/1,045.8 -22.8/-115.6 3.9
1994 38.8/663.3 9.3/512.6 48.1/1,175.9 -29.5/-150.6 4.1
1995 45.6/743.5 11.8/584.7 57.4/1,328.2 -33.8/-158.8 4.3
1996 51.5/795.3 12.0/625.1 63.5/1,420.4 -39.5/-170.2 4.5
1997 62.6/869.7 12.8/689.2 75.4/1,558.9 -49.8/-180.5 4.8
1998 71.2/911.9 14.3/682.1 85.8/1,594 -56.9/-229.8 5.4
1999 81.8/1,024.6 13.1/695.8 94.9/1,719.6 -68.7/-328.8 5.5
2000 100.0/1,218.0 16.3/781.9 116.3/1,199.9 -83.7/-436.1 5.8
2001 102.3/1,141 19.2/729.1 121.5/1,870.1 -83.7/-411.9 6.5
2002 125.2/1,161.4 22.1/693.1 147.3/1,854.5 -103.1/-468.3 7.9
2003 152.4/1,257.1 28.4/724.8 180.8/1,981.9 -124.0/-532.4 9.1
2004 196.7/1,469.7 34.7/818.8 231.4/2,288.5 -162.0/-650.9 10.1
2005 243.5/1,673.5 41.8/906 285.3/2,579.5 -201.6/-767.5 11.1
2006 287.8/1,854 55.2/1,037 343/2,891 -232.5/-817.3 11.9
2007 321.5/1,957 65.2/1,148.2 386.7/3,105.2 -256.3/-808.7 12.5
2008 337.8/2,103.6 71.5/1,287.4 409.2/3,391 -266.3/-816.2 12.1
2009 296.4/1,558.1 69.6/1,056.9 366.0/2,615 -226.8/-501.3 14.0
Note: In millions of current US dollars (in the American system, 1 billion = 1,000 million, 1 trillion =
1,000 billion)
Table 6270. Sino-American Trade, 1991-2009 (China Figures)
Year PRC Imports
from
US/World
PRC Exports
to US/World
Total China-
US/China-
World Trade
China Trade
Balance with
US/World
Percent of
Total PRC
Trade
1991 6.2/71.9 8.0/63.8 14.2/135.7 -1.8/8.1 10.5
1992 8.6/84.9 8.9/80.6 17.7/165.5 -0.3/4.4 10.6
1993 17.0/91.7 10.7/104.0 27.7/195.7 6,28/-12.2 14.2
1994 21.5/121.0 14.0/115.6 35.4/236.6 7.5/5.4 15.0
1995 24.7/148.8 16.1/132.1 40.8/280.9 8.6/16.7 14.5
1996 26.7/151.1 16.2/138.8 42.9/289.9 10.5/12.3 14.8
1997 32.7/182.7 16.3/142.4 49.0/325.2 16.4/40.4 15.1
270 Wang ‘China’s Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective’, p.187
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1998 38.0/183.7 17.0/140.2 55.0/323.9 21.0/43.5 17.0
1999 41.9/194.9 19.5/165.7 61.4/360.6 22.4/29.2 17.0
2000 52.1/249.2 22.4/225.1 74.5/474.3 29.7/24.1 15.7
2001 54.3/266.2 26.2/243.6 80.5/509.8 28.1/22.6 15.8
2002 69.9/325.6 27.2/295.2 97.2/620.8 42.7/30.4 15.7
2003 92.5/438.2 33.9/412.8 126.3/851.0 58.6/25.4 14.8
2004 125.0/593.3 44.7/561.2 169.6/1,154.6 80.3/32.1 14.7
2005 162.9/762.0 48.6/660.0 211.5/1,422 114.3/102.0 14.8
2006 203.4/969.0 59.2/791.5 262.7/1,760.4 144.2/177.5 14.9
2007 232.7/1,218.0 69.4/955.8 302.1/2,173.8 163.3/262.2 13.9
2008 248.4/1,428.6 81.1/1,133.1 329.5/2,561.7 167.3/295.5 12.9
2009 220.8/1,201.7 77.4/1,005.6 298.2/2,207.3 143.4/196.1 13.5
Note: In millions of current US dollars (in the American system, 1 billion = 1,000 million, 1 trillion =
1,000 billion)
Table 7. US and Chinese Trade Figure, 2010-2012271 (US $ million)
US Trade Figures Chinese Trade Figures
Year Exports to
China
(F.A.S)
Imports
from China
(C.V.)
Trade
Balance
Exports to
US (F.O.B)
Imports
from
United
States
(C.I.F)
Trade
Balance
2010 91.878 364.944 -273.066 283.184 103.310 181.873
2011 103.879 399.335 -295.457 324.300 188.121 206.180
2012 110.590 425.644 -311.053 351.884 127.775 224.129
Table 8272: US FDI to China, 2000-2011 (US $ million)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Flow 1,817 1,912 875 1,273 4,499 1,955 4,226 5,243 15,971 -7,853 9,565
Stock 11,140 12,081 10,570 11,261 17,616 19,016 26,459 29,710 52,521 49,403 60,452
Table 9273 China’s Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 2003-2010 (US $ million)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Flow 65.05 119.93 231.82 198.34 195.73 462.03 908.74 1308.29
Stock 502.32 665.20 882.68 1,237.87 1,880.53 2,389.90 3,338.42 4,873.99
271 Martin. ‘What’s the Difference? Comparing US and Chinese Trade Data’, p.2.
272 ‘Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’ (2011), p. 51
273 ‘Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’ (2011), p. 56
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